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The Federal Trade Commission directly administers at least seven differ-
ent statutes, and is charged by Congress with additional tasks on an ad hoc
basis. The Commission's basic power and effectiveness as an agency, however,
rest upon a single sentence in Us enabling statute:
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful.'
This provision, although in fact only a small part of the entire section, is
commonly referred to as "Section 5."
Since the language of Section 5 was deliberately left broad and general,
its exact scope has been determined by the courts through a process of case-
by-case construction. The results of this process are of considerable impor-
tance. The interpretation put upon the word "unfair -
 establishes the
categories of competitive methods prohibited by Section 5 and, in conse-
quence, the range of business conduct that. falls within the Commission's
jurisdiction. This article will present a general overview and summary of the
interpretive process surrounding Section 5. In so doing it will focus on the
competition half of the statute. It will review the legislative and judicial con-
structions of the term "unfair methods of competition," and will attempt to
define where present contours of that statute are now understood to be.
This discussion is divided into eight principal sections. The opening sec-
tion briefly reviews the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The following six sections then discuss the six conceptual categories of
conduct 2
 that will violate the Act: (1) Section 5 will reach conduct that.
directly violates the letter of one of the antitrust statutes; both the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act can be enforced through these means. (2) Section 5
will also reach conduct that threatens an incipient violation of either of those
' 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
The word "conduct -
 is used here because most Section 5 actions histor-
ically have been framed in those terms. This does not necessarily preclude a purely
structural theory, however, and the possibility of such a case will be discussed in text at
notes 263-64 infra.
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statutes. The Commission is empowered to make expert business judgments
about the probable consequences of certain activities, and to prohibit those
likely to result in future antitrust violations. (3) In addition to enforcing the
letter of the antitrust statutes, the Commission can enforce their underlying
policy or "spirit." In this way Section 5 can be used to fill technical loopholes
in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and can also extend those statutes by anal-
ogy to reach conduct which would frustrate their basic objectives. (4) Section 5
might not be restricted to conduct that bears a close relationship with tradi-
tional antitrust violations. However, it also may reach conduct that violates
recognized standards of fair competitive behavior—standards which may be
based on long established business custom, other statutes, or the
Constitution—in at least those circumstances where this conduct has given the
violator a competitive advantage. (5) The Commission also may be authorized
to frame and enforce competition policies by its own initiative. Legislative his-
tory and one Supreme Court decision indicate that the Commission, within
certain limits, may be empowered to halt any activity that results in substantial
harm to the competitive process. (6) Finally, the Commission may make occa-
sional use of the second half of Section 5 in a competition case, and challenge
such conduct as an "unfair act or practice." Once these six major categories of
Section 5 actions have been discussed, the final section of the paper will
examine the standards of judicial review under which the courts will consider
a determination by the Commission that certain conduct has violated the stat-
ute.
This organization seems the most useful, and is also the most faithful to
the analytical categories that have been recognized in previous Supreme Court
decisions. 3 The outline proposed here should still be understood as a tool of
convenience, however, rather than as a rigid or immutable formula. The
lawyer working with Section 5 should be aware that these categories are noth-
ing more than devices for applying the single underlying concept of "unfair
methods of competition" to a variety of factual situations. An actual case
might depart from this outline in any of several ways. A court might find that
a certain course of conduct violates Section 5 simultaneously under several
different theories and therefore may reach cumulative holdings. A court also
might engage in a composite holding—although none appears yet to have
clone so—under which certain conduct would be found improper through a
sequential combination of theories. And finally, of course, a court may recog-
nize some entirely new category of unfair competition. All of this is to suggest
that Section 5 is a broad and flexible statute, and one that leaves considerable
room for thoughtful and constructive application.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Before considering judicial interpretations of Section 5, it will be useful
to review the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Legisla-
tive history is an integral part of any exercise in statutory construction, but is
" Organizational schemes generally similar to the one adopted here have
been used in, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, pp. 167-74 (1975); 1 CCH
TRADE REG. RpTR. 11 805.
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particularly important where, as here, the statute is written in vague and gen-
eral language, and draws its meaning from the entire climate of regulatory'
and social-reform goals then current. The discussion of the legislative history
will be divided into several parts. A general overview of the congressional
intent will be presented in this section, while more detailed references will be
deferred until the discussion in later sections of specific types of conduct that
might he considered "unfair."
The legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act begins, in a
sense, in the year 1890 with the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act..' The
Sherman Act marked the first venture by Congress into the establishment of a
national competition policy. Under the Sherman Act the Justice Department
was charged with the dual tasks of attacking contracts, combinations and con-
spiracies in restraint. of trade, and of moving against monopolies and attempts
to monopolize. Each type of case was to proceed as an adversary litigation in the
federal courts. 5
 Reliance on the district' courts simplified administration of
the Sherman Act, but also proved, in the eyes of many congressmen, to be its
undoing. These courts soon added a judicial gloss to the Act, replacing an
absolute prohibition on trade restraints with the "Rule of Reason." The Su-
preme Court adopted this rule in Standard Oil Co. v. United States." Hence-
forth the Sherman Act would be construed in light of the following princi-
ples:
The statute ... evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to
make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from combination or
otherwise, which did not unduly restrain interstate or foreign com-
merce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by
methods, whether old or new, which would constitute an interfer-
ence that is an undue restraint  Thus not specifying but indubita-
bly contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows that it was
intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the
common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the
character embraced by the statute, was intended to be the measure
used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a par-
ticular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which
the statute provided.'
In other words, the process of judicially interpreting the Sherman Act, en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil, ensured that not all restraints
4
 For a general discussion of the legislative history see Baker & Baum, Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VILLANOVA L.
REV. 517 (1962), which is probably the best single article on the subject. See also H.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955) (emphasis on Sherman Act); E.
KINTNER, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Am: OF 1914 (to be published); Rublee,
The Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade. Commission, 11 ACAD. POL. Sm.
PROC. 666 (1926) (written by one of the originators of the idea); Montague, Unfair
Methods of Competition, 25 YALE L.J. 20 (1915) (emphasis on legislative debates).
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1979).
' 221 U.S. 1 (1911), rev'g United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290 (1897).
7 221 U.S. at 60.
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on trade would be deemed to violate that statute. Only those restraints found
unreasonable in the context of a particular case would be declared illegal.
The Standard Oil decision was not well received in Congress. The day
alter the decision was announced, Senator Newlands of Nevada, later to be-
come the principal sponsor of the Federal Trade Commission Act, recom-
mended corrective legislation:
The question therefore presents itself to us whether we are to per-
mit in the future the administration regarding these great combina-
tions to drift practically into the hands of the courts and subject the
question as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any re-
straint upon trade ... to the varying judgments of different courts
upon the facts and the law, or whether we will organize, as the ser-
vant of Congress, an administrative tribunal similar to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, with powers of recommendation, with pow-
ers of condemnation, with powers of correction similar to those en-
joyed by the Interstate Commerce Commission over interstate trans-
portation.'
There followed a three-year period of congressional activity in the competi-
tion area. Senator Newlands set the process in motion shortly after he made
the speech quoted above, introducing two bills that may be considered the
precursors of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'' Both bills provided for
the federal registration of corporations, created an interstate trade commis-
sion, and introduced an elastic concept of unfairness. The provisions stated
that "Rifle said Commission may at any time ... revoke and cancel the regis-
tration of any corporation ... upon the ground of either violation of any
operative judicial decree rendered under [the Sherman Act] ... or the use of
materially unfair or oppressive methods of competition."'"
Neither of Senator Newlands' bills became law, but they paved the way
for passage of Senate Resolution 98," which authorized the Committee on
Interstate Commerce to hold hearings on the need for the new antitrust legis-
lation. The committee received three months of testimony and compiled a
record of some 2,800 pages. On February 26 the majority report was issued.
This is the "Cummins Report," named in honor of ,its principal author,
Senator Cummins of Iowa. It generally confirmed Senator Newlands' objec-
tions to Standard Oil and the Rule of Reason. The report declared that
"whenever the rule is invoked the court does not administer the law, but
makes the law."" To the authors of the report it was "inconceivable that in a
country governed by a written Constitution and statute law the courts can be
permitted to test each restraint of trade by the economic standard which the
47 CONG. REC. 1225 (1911).
S. 2941 was introduced on July 5, 1911. A substitute bill, bearing the same
number, was introduced on August 21 of that year. For the text of the former bill see
47 CONG. REC. 2619-20 (1911).
" Id. at § 10.
Res. 98, 62d Cong„ 1st Sess. (1911). For the text of the Resolution see 47
CONG. REC. 3225 (1911).
12 S. REP, No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., at xii.
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individual members of the court may happen to approve."" Nor, in their
opinion, had Supreme Court review led to sufficient predictability or uniform-
ity of outcomes:
There are many forms of combination, and many practices in busi-
ness which have been so unequivocally condemned by the Supreme
Court that as to them and their like the statute is so clear that no
person can be in any doubt respecting what is lawful and what is
unlawful; but as the statute is now construed there are ... many
other practices that seriously interfere with competition, and are
plainly opposed to the public welfare, concerning which it is impos-
sible to predict with any certainty whether they will be held to be
due or undue restraints of trade."
The committee concluded that further action was necessary to remedy the
perceived weaknesses in the interpretation of the Sherman Act. They
suggested that in the measures then pending before Congress, it will be very
desirable to accompany such legislation with a measure establishing a commis-
sion for the better administration of the law and to aid in its enforcement."''
It is against this background that the bills which eventually became the
Federal Trade Commission Act were introduced in Congress. On January 22,
1914, S. 4160 was introduced in the Senate by Mr. Newlands. On the same
day Representative Clayton, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, intro-
duced H.R. 12120 in the House of Representatives.'" Mr. Clayton's bill was
identical to the Senate version, and this was not the same legislation that later
became known as the Clayton Act.. Mr. Clayton's bill was unexpectedly re-
ferred to the Interstate Commerce Committee. Mr. Covington, the chairman of
that committee, introduced a somewhat similar measure on April 13, 1914.''
It was Mr. Covington's bill that eventually passed the House, while Mr. New-
lands' was eventually successful in the Senate.
Before considering the legislative history of these bills before the Con-
gress, it is useful to pause and see what can be learned from the events
leading up to their introduction. One aspect of this analysis is clear. The
congressional reaction to Standard Oil was extraordinarily prompt, and its
condemnation of the Rule of Reason was greatly disproportionate to any offense
that the Court may have actually given. After all, few would object in principle
to the concept of "reasonableness," and equally few would assert that the Sher-
man Act was meant to bar every routine commercial contract as a "restraint of
trade."'8
 It seems clear that something else about the Court's action was dis-
turbing the legislators.
' 	 Id.
14 Id. at xiv.
14 Id. The legislation in question s,,as a federal incorporation statute that con-
tained prohibitions on certain trade practices and an elastic clause to reach new prac-
tices. Id.
1 " See S. REP. No. 597, 63c1 Cong., 2d Sess., at 7-8 (1914).
'' This was H.R. 15613.
'H A number of Senators stated specifically that, in their opinion, Slandard Oil
had not modified the original intent of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., 51 CoNG. Ri:c.
12871 (1914) (remarks of Senator !kulturelle, a member of the Conference Commit-
tee); id. at 12733 (remarks of Senator Weeks).
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It is less than clear just what that something was. It may have been only a
reflexive distaste for the process by which the Rule of Reason came about, for
lawyers under the somewhat different jurisprudence of that time, and not yet
exposed to the flexible constructions of the due process and commerce
clauses, were probably unused to any process of judicial legislation. To a more
important extent, however, the congressional reaction probably reflects, not
displeasure with the outcome in Standard Oil itself, but rather a sudden reali-
zation of the costs that were always inherent in a procedure for litigating
antitrust cases in the courts. Three such costs were .to be identified as the
debates progressed: (1) delay in resolution;" (2) divergence in results from
court to court; 20
 and (3) a shift in control of antitrust policy from Congress to
the judiciary. A fourth consideration received little attention in the early
studies, but later was to assume dominant importance. The Sherman Act was
in fact rather narrow, and did not empower the courts to condemn conduct
before an industry had reached the brink of monopoly. 21
 None of these four
problems arose out of the Standard Oil decision; they were inherent in the
Sherman Act from the beginning. Standard Oil, by articulating the inevitable
Rule of Reason, merely brought these weaknesses forcefully to the attention
of the Congress.
Thus it appears that the congressional reaction to Standard Oil was moti-
vated in large part by jurisdictional and administrative considerations, and
only secondarily by concern over the uncertainties introduced by the Rule of
Reason. The initial task for the legislature was to recover the power to control
antitrust policies. It was to prevent subversion of' the legislative intent by dis-
trict courts that either were unsympathetic or otherwise preoccupied, and,
conversely, to broaden antitrust enforcement beyond the substantive limita-
tions that were coming to be perceived in the Sherman Act. It will be recalled
that Senator Newlands, in his first address on the subject, spoke of the need
to establish an administrative tribunal "as the servant of Congress." 22
 Those
jurisdictional concerns were not inappropriate. The point is merely that they
came to predominate, and specific concerns over the Rule of Reason ulti-
mately proved less important than they first appeared. This is illustrated by
the willingness of Congress to insert a test. of "unfairness" into the bills before
'" See, e.g., 51 CON G. REC. 8977 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Murdock);
id. at 11105 (remarks of Senator Cummins).
2 " It was probably this factor, more than the Rule of Reason, that resulted in
uncertainty for business. A number of congressmen stated, although without. discuss-
ing the distinction, that. they hoped the new commission would increase business cer-
tainty. See, e.g., 51 CoNe;. RFC. 11086 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); id. at
8977 (remarks of Congressman Murdock); id. at 11088 (text of President Wilson's mes-
sage to Congress).
'See text at notes 71-74 infra. Many congressmen therefore supported the
FTC Act in order to better assure a competitive structure for American industry. Some
also had in mind a more indirect social goal: that of assuring a pluralist, individualist
society. and thereby heading off popular pressures for some form of state socialism.
See, e.g., 51 Co;.N REC. 11379 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); id. at 11302
(remarks of Senator (torah); id. at 8850 (remarks of Congressman Stevens, a member
of the
 conference Committee).
" See note 8 supra.
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it in 1914, thus re-introducing as much flexibility and uncertainty as the Rule
of Reason had ever embodied.
The bills as originally introduced contained no reference to unfairness.
Instead they contemplated a commission with specific and limited powers.
The new agency would receive annual reports from large corporations; would
investigate Sherman Act cases on behalf of the justice Department; and would
report to the President and Congress on the need for additional antitrust
legislation. Thus the new agency would have the powers of publicity and per-
suasion, but few substantive powers beyond those.
This limited scope was changed as the Newlands bill emerged from the
Interstate Commerce Committee. The committee had strengthened the origi-
nal bill in a number of ways. Most notably, the limitations in the Sherman Act
were to be corrected by making "unfair competition" in commerce unlawful.
This was accomplished through the provisions of Section 5 of the amended
bill. The committee report explained the change as follows:
One of the most important provisions of the bill is that which de-
clares unfair competition in commerce to be unlawful, and empow-
ers the commission to prevent corporations from using unfair meth-
ods of competition in commerce by order issued after hearing....
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to
whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair
practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid [them) ... or
whether it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair prac-
tices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices were
unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be better, for the
reason, as stated by one of the representatives of the Illinois Man-
ufacturer's Association, that there were too many unfair practices to
define, and after writing 20 of them into law it would be quite possi-
ble to invent others. 23
Senator Newlands was comfortable with the broadened language. This is
hardly surprising, since he was committee chairman and since the new refer-
ence to "unfair competition" was similar to the language in the bill he had
first introduced in 1911. 24
 "My belief," he said, "is that this phrase will cover
23
 The committee further stated:
It is believed that the term "unfair competition" has a legal significance
which can be enforced by the commission and the courts, and that it is no
more difficult to determine what is unfair competition than it is to deter-
mine what is a reasonable rate or what is an unjust discrimination. The
committee was of the opinion that it would be better to put in a general
provision condemning unfair competition than to attempt to define the
numerous unfair practices such as local price cutting, interlocking director-
ates, and holding companies intended to restrain substantial competition.
S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., at 13 (1914). Some members of the House de-
sired to make a parallel change in the Covington bill. See the dissenting statements in
H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 9 el seq. (1914). See also 51 CONG. REC.
8977 (remarks of Congressman Murdock); id. at 9049 (remarks of Congressman Mor-
gan); id. at 9062-63 (remarks of Congressman Good).
24 See text at notes 9 and 10 supra.
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everything that we want, and will have such an elastic character that it will
meet every new condition and every new practice that may be invented with a
view to gradually bringing about monopoly through unfair competition." 25
Even the concrete definition that he gave is striking in its breadth: "[T]he
question is what unfair competition covers. It covers every practice and
method between competitors upon the part of one against the other that is
against public morals, ... or is an offense for which a remedy lies either at
law or in equity." 2"
The broad language introduced by the committee soon was extended
further. A number of Senators observed that the phrase "unfair competition"
already had a recognized and limited meaning at common law—that of pas-
sing off the goods. of one company as the products of another. Senator Reed
of Missouri feared that this precedent would jeopardize the future of the new
Section 5:
It is my opinion that if' we employ the term 'unfair competition' as it
is employed in this bill, without adding anything to it, the courts will
adopt as the meaning of Congress that meaning which has been af-
fixed to the term by all of the law dictionaries and by a great many
legal authorities. 27
An inspired solution to this problem was proposed by Senator Hollis, who
suggested "that the words 'unfair' and 'competition' be separated by some
word that will not do them any harm, such as 'oppressive' or 'methods of so
that there will not be the particular label that has been attached in many
cases." 28 An amendment to this effect was eventually adopted," thus con-
firming that the Senate intended Section 5 to have a general reach uncon-
strained by previous common law interpretations of "unfair competition." 3()
The very breadth of Section 5 meant that, in applying it, reference
would have to be made to the same Rule of Reason that had been the ostensi-
ble motive for taking up the Federal Trade Commission Act in the first place.
Senator Cummins was well aware of this. He noted that "Ulf the rule of
reason—and I am not quarreling with the rule of reason, because it must
prevail everywhere—if the rule of reason is used to interpret the phrase 're-
straint of trade,' likewise will the rule of' reason be used to interpret the
" 51 CoNG. Ric. 12024 (1914).
2 " 51 CONG. REC. 11112 (1914).
27 51 CONG. REC. 12936 (1914). See also 51 CoNG. Rix. 12814 (1914) (remarks
of Senator Sutherland).
28
 51 CONG. REC. 12145 (1914).
2"
 This change was not made until the meeting of the Conference Committee.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1142 (1914). When discussing the conference bill Senator Cummins
observed that "IiIn my judgment these two phrases mean exactly the same thing." 51
CONG. REC. 14768 (1914). See also id. at 14786. For a statement of the House of Rep-
resentatives' reasons for the change see 51 CONG. REC. 14937 (1914) (remarks of Con-
gressman Stevens).
" A number of cases have held that "unfair methods of competition" has a
broader meaning than "unfair competition." See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291
U.S. 304, 310-11 n.1 (1934); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931).
236	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:227
phrase 'unfair competition.' "" 1
 Despite this apparent. anomaly, however,
Congress had wrought two important changes in the situation that had pre-
vailed after Standard Oil. First, the Rule of Reason would henceforth be used
to interpret an underlying statute that was much broader than the Sherman
Act, so that the Rule itself would limit. antitrust. enfOrcement much less than it.
had under the earlier provision. Second, the Rule would be applied, at least in
the first instance, by the new Commission rather than by the courts. Hence
there should be a more informed application of the law—since the Commis-
sion was designed to accumulate and develop expertise in business and
economics " 2
 —and many of the problems that had been observed in judicial
enforcement could be avoided. Senator Cummins spoke to this point. as well:
I realize that if these five men were either unfaithful to the trust
reposed in them or if their economic t.hought or trend of thought.
was contrary to the best interests of the people, the commission
might. do great harm. I realize that just. as I realize that the trend of"
economic thought. upon the part of some judges has done and will
continue to do great harm, or rather will continue to render ineffec-
tive to a degree a statute that it was believed by its authors would
exterminate the monopolies then in existence and prevent the estab-
lishment. of others.
I would rather take my chance with a commission at all times under
the power of Congress, at all times under the eye of the people .. .
than ... upon the abstract propositions, even though they be full of
importance, argued in the comparative seclusion of the courts. " 3
The committee's version of the bill, therefore, although adopting the criticized
Rule of Reason, contained revisions sufficient to minimize many of the faults
perceived in the interpretation of the Sherman Act.
With matters in this posture the Federal Trade Commission Act passed
the Senate. The House version of the bill, as introduced by Mr. Covington,
likewise passed that body and was duly transmitted to the Senate. The Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce recommended, however, that the Senate
'' 51 CONG. REC. 12915 (1914). A number of other congressmen observed
that Section 5 was just as uncertain as the Sherman Act after Standard Oil. See, e.g., 51
CONG. REC. I I I (14 (remarks of Senator Lewis); id. at 11389 (remarks of Senator Cum-
mins); id. at I I 600 (remarks of Senator Borah); id. at 13000 (remarks of Senator Hol-
lis).
;" The impo rtance that Congress ascribed to Commission expertise was de-
scribed by the Supreme Court in the following terms:
[The Commission] was created with the avowed purpose of lodging the
administrative functions committed to it in a "body specially competent to
deal with them by reason of information, experience, and careful study of
the business and economic conditions of the industry affected. -
 and it was
organized in such a manner, with respect to the length and expiration of
the terms of office of its members, as would "give to them an opportunity
to acquire the expertness in dealing with these special questions concerning
industry that comes from experience."
FTC v. K.F. Keppel & Bro., inc., 291 U.S. 304. 314 (1934), quoting REPORT OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, No. 597, June 13, 1914, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 9, 11.
"" 51 CoNG. REC. 13047 (1914).
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bill by Newlands be substituted for the House version: The substitution was
made; the Conference Committee suggested some further amendments; 34
both Houses concurred; and President Wilson signed the resulting legislation
into law on September 26, 1914. 35
The judicial decisions which have reviewed this legislative history confirm
that the Commission has, as it must have, considerable flexibility in determin-
ing which particular acts or practices will constitute "unfair methods of com-
petition." The Supreme Court stated that this term "belongs to that class of
phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and appli-
cation of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has
called the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.' " 36 The Court
has reiterated this point in many subsequent opinions. In 1965, for example,
it noted:
The Congress intentionally left development of the term 'unfair' to
the Commission rather than attempting to define the many and var-
iable unfair practices which prevail in commerce ....' In thus divin-
ing that there is no limit to business ingenuity and legal gymnastics
the Congress displayed much foresight. "7
The Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion:
The Commission has wide latitude in such matters; its powers are
not confined to such practices as would be unlawful before it acted;
they are more than procedural; its duty in part at any rate, is to
discover and make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair deal-
ing which the conscience of the community may progressively de-
velop."'
Judicial language of this sort is striking in its implication of broad Commission
discretion. It does not, however, define the intended scope of this discretion.
This language establishes only the Commission's general authority to single
out and proscribe certain individual business tactics such as price fixing,
commercial bribery, or disparagement. 3"
 The language does not help to de-
fine the broad conceptual categories of conduct within which the Commission
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
This legislative history is recapitulated in the Conference Report, H.R. REP.
No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). At the same time the Clayton Act was proceed-
ing through the Congress as a separate piece of legislation. It too eventually passed,
and became law two weeks after the Federal Trade Commission Act. A more detailed
discussion of the Clayton bill will he deferred until the section of this article that deals
specifically with the relationships between the two statutes. Sec text at notes 141-53.
" FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931).
" Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965) (citation omitted).
" FTC v. Standard Educ. Society, 86 F.2(1 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936) (1... Hand,
J.). rev'd in part on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). See also FTC v. Sperry & Hutch-
inson Co.. 405 U.S. 233, 241 (1972) ("the sWeep and flexibility of this approach were
thus made crystal clear"); H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong.. 2d Sess., at 19 (1914) Cif
Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task").
" Extensive listings of such forbidden tactics may be found at 16 C.F. R. §§
13.1 et seq., and in the Statement of Basis and Purpose for the Cigarette Advertising
Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354-55 (1964).
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can make these determinations, and it therefore does not help to define the
actual scope of Section 5. It is to the identification of those broad categories
that the remainder of this article is devoted.
II. Con:Dour VIOLATING THE LETTER OF
ONE OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The first general category consists of conduct that. would violate the let-
ter of one of the antitrust laws. 40 Actions that will violate the Sherman,
Clayton, or Robinson-Patman Acts also will violate Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. This proposition was succinctly stated by the Supreme
Court. The Court noted that Section 5 "minimally ... registers violations of
the Clayton and Sherman Acts." 4 '
This category of Section 5 violations actually finds less support in the
legislative history than do most of the others. There was, in theory, little need
for the Congress to make such offenses cognizable under Section 5. Clayton
Act violations could be prosecuted by the Commission directly under that stat-
me," without need to resort to the FTC Act.. Sherman Act violations could be
prosecuted by the Justice Department under existing arrangements that, if
not wholly satisfactory, were at least in place and functioning." For these
reasons Senator Newlands gave at least passing consideration to the idea of
withholding Sherman Act jurisdiction from the new commission. indeed,
some of his remarks suggest that. he viewed the FTC Act as doing precisely
that:
This bill does not interfere with the Attorney General in the ad-
ministration of the antitrust law. There has been a great indisposi-
tion to change in any way the Sherman antitrust law, in which the
country has confidence, or to change the agency through which that
law is administered, so that this bill leaves the powers of the Attor-
ney General as complete as ever with reference to the enforcement
of the antitrust law.... All the powers of this commission are in aid
of the courts and in aid of the Attorney General, and are not in-
tended to interfere with his control over the enforcement of the
Sherman law. 44
4U Some cases have stated that the Federal Trade Commission Act is not itself
an "antitrust law." See Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 182, 186 (D. Vt.
1969); ef. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1958) (definition
contained in the Clayton Act is "exclusive"). Although most people today would prob-
ably view the Act as, in part, an antitrust law, we follow the view expressed in these
cases for simplicity of exposition.
41
 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953).
42 See Clayton Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976).
43 See Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
" 51 CONG. REG. 11083 (1914). See also S. REP. No. 597 at pp. 10, 12 (1914);
51 CONG. REC. 11234-35 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); id. at 12146 (remarks
of Senator Hollis). Senator Newlands also believed that his original 1911 proposal,
whose language was similar in relevant respects, would have had the same effect: "[As]
the 'Attorney General's office is now proceeding, to the satisfaction of the country to
break up the existing trusts, I thought it best not to complicate the work of the new
commission with the administration of the Sherman Act." 47 CONG. REC. 2621 (1911).
These remarks may have meant, however, only that the Commission would not have
sole responsibility for the Sherman Act.
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Other language from the 1914 debates supports the more inclusive construc-
tion, however. At one point Senator Newlands noted that. Section 5 would
encompass every "offense for which a remedy lies either at law or in
equity."" This test presumably would include violations of the Sherman Act.
Whatever the ambiguities in the original legislative history, the Supreme
Court has since clearly held that Congress did not intend to withdraw the
other antitrust statutes from the reach of Section 5. Challenges under that
section to both Sherman Act and Clayton Act violations have been upheld.
A. Sherman Act violations
The applicability of Section 5 to Sherman Act violations was decided in
FTC v. Cement Institute, -"' a case involving the cement industry trade associa-
tion." Members of the association had maintained a multiple basing-point
delivered-pricing system. This system enabled the members to quote identical
prices and terms of sale for cement at any given destination. The respondents
argued that if these facts made out a violation of any kind, it was a violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act rather than of Section 5 of the FTC Act. To
this assertion the Court replied:
Assuming, without deciding, that the conduct charged in each court
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act, we hold that the Commis-
sion does have jurisdiction to conclude that such conduct may also be
an unfair method of competition and hence constitute a violation of
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'"
Somewhat later in its opinion the Court reasserted the point even more un-
compromisingly, stating that a Section 5 action would lie "even though the
selfsame conduct may also violate the Sherman Act."'" In reaching this hold-
ing the Court considered and rejected a defense based on the legislative his-
tory discussed above. The Court stated that "on the whole the Act's legislative
history shows a strong congressional purpose not only to continue enforce-
ment of the Sherman Act by the Department of Justice and the federal dis-
trict courts but also to supplement that enforcement through the administra-
tive process of the new Trade Commission." 5"
The Court offered two reasons for reaching this conclusion, one princi-
pled and one pragmatic. The principled reason was that the Commission was
a body with wide and flexible jurisdiction, empowered by Congress to eradi-
cate all unfair practices 'then existing or thereafter contrived," 5 ' and a with-
" 51 CONG. REC. 11112 (1914).
46 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
47
 Even prior to the Cement Institute holding this was generally assumed to be
the law, on the basis of FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.. 257 U.S. 441 (1922). This case
is discussed in greater detail in text at notes 128-32 infra.
48 333 U.S. at 690.
49 Id. at 693. Section 5 will not literally reach every Sherman Act violation,
however, since the FTC Act also imposes some unique jurisdictional limitations. See
Community Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F.2c1 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 1969) (FTC cannot
challenge practices of organizations that operate neither for their own profit nor that
of their members).
so 333 U.S. at 692.
51 Id. at 693.
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clrawal of Sherman Act. jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the breadth of
the fundamental legislative purpose. The pragmatic reason looked to the
probable consequences of such a withdrawal. To the Court there was "no
greater obstacle ... to the ltdfillment of these congressional purposes than to
inject into every Trade Commission proceeding brought under § 5 and into
every Sherman Act suit brought by the Justice Department a possible jurisdic-
tional question. - "
The Commission's jurisdiction over a Sherman Act type of claim will not
be defeated even if the Justice Department subsequently brings a suit founded
expressly on that statute. This, in Fact., was the situation involved in Cement
Institute. The Court. held that the two cases could proceed independently:
Just as the Sherman Act itself permits the Attorney General to bring
simultaneous civil and criminal suits against a defendant based on
the same misconduct, so the Sherman Act and the Trade Commis-
sion Act. provide the Government. with cumulative remedies against.
activity detrimental to competition.'"
The lower courts have upheld numerous Section 5 actions based on the letter
of the Sherman Act. Such actions have challenged group boycotts,' 4 collusion
on terms of sale,'':' and, most. commonly, price-fixing. 5 "
B. Clayton Act violations
A Section 5 action also can he brought on the basis of facts t.hat would
make out. a Clayton Act. violation. Such cases arc less common than those
based on facts that would constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, presuma-
bly because the Commission is authorized to enforce the Clayton Act di-
rectly."' It is therefore unnecessary to bring such an action under the um-
brella of Section 5. In Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC," however, the Su-
preme Court made it clear that. the Commission can proceed in that manner if
it chooses.
Fashion Originators' involved the activities of a trade group made up of
the designers and manufacturers of original-fashion women's clothing. The
Guild was formed primarily to combat. "style piracy - -the practice of copying
original fashions and selling the copies at disaitint prices. To this end the
Guild members agreed that they would collectively refuse to deal with any
retailer who carried the products of style copyists. This threat proved to be
52 Id .
5" Id. at 694.
' 4 See Millinery Creators' Guild v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175. 176 (2d Cir. 1940),
aff'd. 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
See Butterick Publishing Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1936).
"" See, e.g., Virginia Excelsior Mills v. FTC, 256 F.2c1 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1958);
Standard Container Mfrs.' Ass'n v. FTC, 119 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1941): California
Rice Industry v. FTC, 102 F.2d 716. 719 (9th Cir. 1939); cf: Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC.
497 F.2d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (vertical
price fixing).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976).
" 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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successful and merchants abandoned the copyists in favor of the established
producers of original designs. The Commission sued under Section 5 and
issued a cease-and-desist order. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commis-
sion's order on the alternative ground that this conduct constituted a violation
of the Clayton Act, and therefore of Section 5:
[The] relevance of this section of the Clayton Act to petitioners'
scheme is shown by the fact that the scheme is bottomed upon a
system of sale under which ... garment manufacturers shall sell to
retailers only upon the condition and understanding that the retail-
ers shall not use or deal in such copied designs. And the Federal
Trade Commission concluded in the language of the Clayton Act
that these understandings substantially lessened competition and
tended to create a monopoly. We hold that the Commission, upon
adequate and unchallenged findings, correctly concluded that this
practice constituted an unfair method of competition. 59
Drawing upon this authority, a number of lower court decisions have
held that Section 5 will reach violations of the letter of the Clayton Act. Most
of these cases involved exclusive dealing requirements. 90 There is no princi-
pled reason why Section 5 should be confined to this particular facet of the
Clayton Act, however, and several other cases have noted in dictum that the
statute will reach, for example, mergers that. would violate the letter of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act."'
Although the Commission may be technically empowered to sue under
Section 5 alone, the better policy is to base at least the primary charge directly
on the Clayton Act wherever it is feasible to do so. 62 This procedure will
give the respondent more precise warning of the charges against him, and will
5" Id. at 464 (footnote omitted).
"" See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Mytinger & Cassclberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534,
539 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (alternative ground); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d
722, 734 (8th Cir. 1940) (alternative ground). See also United States v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 285 F.2d 607, 612 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd 368 U.S. 208 (1961) (on action to enforce
6(b) order).
'' See United States v. Papercrafi Corp., 540 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1976);
FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 28 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973); Stanley Works v. FTC, 469
F.2d 498, 499 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). But cf. FTC v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 291-92 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977) (no case has upheld
the propriety of reaching such mergers under Section 5). An interesting anomaly is
the decision in Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973). which might be construed as upholding, by implication,
the propriety of a merger action under Section 5. See also text at notes 188-193 infra.
"2 Courts have sometimes reacted sarcastically to duplicative charges of
Clayton Act and Section 5 violations. See, e.g., FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 28
11.6 (2d Cir. 1973). There may, however, he certain cases where it is justifiable to
proceed solely or primarily under Section 5. This may he true, for example, when the
Commission wishes to establish a novel theory of liability under the Clayton Act, but,
in fairness to the respondent, does not wish to subject him to the risk of a subsequent
private damage action.
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contribute to a clearer understanding of the nature of the action."'` For
reasons such as these the Attorney General's Committee concluded that Sec-
tion 5 "should not be invoked whenever the transaction in question is governed
by specific provisions in the Clayton Act.""4
 This is, however, only an ex-
pression of preference. The pleadings themselves will give a respondent. suffi-
cient notice of the theory under. Section 5 that will be relied upon." At-
tempts to have actions dismissed on due process grounds have therefore
proven unsuccessful."
III. CONDUCT THREATENING AN INCIPIENT VIOLATION OF
ONE OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Section 5 also will reach conduct that threatens to bring about an anti-
trust. violation in the foreseeable future. This authority was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co." 7 in the Following
terms:
It is ... clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to
supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act—to
stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown,
would violate those Acts, as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of
competition' existing violations of them."
In establishing this as a general category of Section 5 authority the Supreme
Court has indicated that it is executing a particularly clear legislative in-.
tent." 9
 The Court appears to be correct in this assessment. The goal of halt-
ing incipient violations has more support in the legislative history than any of
the other five categories of Section 5 violations.
63
 Moreover, an adjudication of guilt under the Clayton Act may be primafade evidence in subsequent private treble damage actions, which should increase the
deterrent effect of Commission proceedings. See Farmington Dowel Products v. Forster
Mfg. Co., Inc., 421 F.2d 61, 76 (1st Cir. 1969).
64
 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS, at 148-49 n.78 (March 21, 1955); accord, Oppenheim, Guides to Har-
monizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commi,csion Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59
Micn. L. REV. 821, 851 (1961).
65 See Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum).
" See Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973).
6 T 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
68 Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted). The Fashion Originators' case had expressed
this concept in somewhat similar language: "WE was the object of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to reach not merely in their fruition but also in their incipiency com-
binations which could lead to these and other trade restraints and practices deemed
undesirable." Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941).
" The Court has observed:
All of the committee reports and the statements of those in charge of the
Trade Commission Act reveal an abiding purpose to vest both the Com-
mission and the courts with adequate powers to hit at. every trade practice,
then existing or thereafter contrived, which restrained competition or
might lead to such restraint if not stopped in its incipient stages.
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
January 19801	 UNFAIR COMPETITION	 243
This support did not materialize with one stroke. Congress first had to
overcome its early focus on the Rule of Reason, recognize that the real
problems were those inherent in the Sherman Act itself, and receive the
Commerce Committee amendment that added the prohibition against "unfair
methods of competition." Once these steps were taken, however, the legis-
lators' attention then shifted to the utility of the new Section 5 in forestalling
Sherman Act violations. It seemed to them that an effective means of dealing
with trusts was to forbid the unfair practices that allowed them to grow. As
one article described it, "Mlle legislative history of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act is replete with references which reiterate that the function of the
Commission would he to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency.""
Various comments made just prior to the enactment of the statute illus-
trate this climate of legislative ()pinion. The Conference Committee report
noted that "kiln; most certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to
prevent unfair competition.' Senator Reed of Missouri made the following
observation:
We are declaring that we intend to do something that will strike a
death blow 10 monopoly; we propose to arrest its progress in its in-
fancy. We are dealing not with honest mistakes in judgment, but
with acts which are in their nature malicious, with the same class of
conspiracies exactly as the Sherman Antitrust. Act deals with, except
that we propose to strike those acts in their incipiency instead of
after they have been actually worked out into a complete system of
monopoly or restraint of trade. 72
Similar comments were made in the House of Representatives. Congressman
Stevens identified the most important."' reason for supporting the act as that
"it will give to this commission the power of preventing in their conception
and in their beginning some of these unfair processes in competition which
have been the chief source of monopoly." 73 It was Senator Newlands, how-
ever, who stated the goal most. tersely. "We want," he said, "to check
monopoly in the embryo."" With its legislative bona fides thus established,
the incipiency theory has been invoked in a number of cases to forestall
threatened violations of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
A. Incipient Sherman Act violations
The best-known Sherman Act incipiency cases involve threatened viola-
tions of Section 2; they involve incipient monopolization. One such care was
Fashion Originators' Guild v. F7'C. 75 We previously saw this decision as illus-
Nlachityre • Volhard, The Federal Trade Commission and Incipient Unfairness,
41 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 407, 414-15 (1973) (footnote omitted).
H.R. REP. NO. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., at 19 (1914).
72 51 CONG. Rec. 13118 (1914).
n 51 Cost:. REC. 14941 (1914).
74 51 CONG. REC. 12030 (1914). See also 51 CONG. REC. 14929 (1914) (remarks
of Congressman Covington); id. at 11455 (remarks of Senator Cummins); id. at 12147
(remarks of Senator Hollis).
73 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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trating a present violation of the Clayton Act. The case also was based, how-
ever, on the alternative theory of an incipient violation of the Sherman Act.
The members of the Guild accounted for more than 60 percent of all
women's garments wholesaling at $10.75 or more, and the Guild was therefore
close to establishing a collusive monopoly. The Court found that a cause of
action was stated on these facts:
[It was not] determinative in considering the policy of the Sherman
Act that petitioners may not yet have achieved a complete monopoly
.... It was, in fact, one of the hopes of those who sponsored the
Federal Trade Commission Act that its effects might be prophylactic
and that through it attempts to bring about complete monopolization
of an industry might be stopped in their incipiency."
A theory of incipient Sherman Act violation may be particularly appro-
priate in reaching attempts to monopolize that do not meet the requirements
of Section 2. Such an attempt might, for example, lack a sufficient "probabil-
ity of success." The conduct might still be reached through Section 5's more
forward-looking standard of incipiency. This possibility is illustrated by Hast-
ings Manufacturing Co. v. FTC." Hastings, a manufacturer of piston rings for
the automobile aftermarket, embarked upon a program to improve the expo-
sure it received through its jobbers. To this end it requested assurances of
exclusivity from its jobbers and, in cases where these could not be obtained,
offered to buy up (or "lift -) the jobbers' inventory of competing brands."
Through these means Hastings grew from one of the smallest piston ring
manufacturers to become the second largest. It was still far from monopoliz-
ing the industry, however, and a Sherman Act action probably could not have
been brought. An action under Section 5 nonetheless accomplished the same
results. The circuit court observed that "[i]t was not imperative, in order to
bring into play the 'prophylactic' action of the Commission, to prove that
monopoly actually has been achieved."'•
The theory of incipient violations will also apply to enforce Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, which forbids contracts or combinations in restraint of
trade. One case suggesting this application of the theory is Triangle Conduit &
Cable Co. v. FTC." There the manufacturers of electrical conduits had
7 " 312 U.S. at 466. See also Luria Bros. & Co: v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847, 859 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 28 F.T.C. 1057,
1072 (1939), u/f'd, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941). It will be noted that the Court in
Fashion Originators' Guild referred to the "policy" of the Sherman Act, thus evoking a
separate category of Section 5 violations that will be discussed below under the head-
ing of "conduct contrary to the spirit of the antitrust laws.'' The substance of the
Court's remarks dealt with actual incipiency, however, the reference to "policy" should
not be read as altering this meaning.
" 153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946). In 1979 the
FTC proposed, on other grounds, a modification of the order in this case. See Docket
No. 4437, Dec. 26, 1979.
" See 153 F.2d at 255.
7" Id. at 257.
8" 168 F.2d 175 (71h Cir. 1948), affd by an equally divided Court sub nont.
Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC. 336 U.S. 596 (1949).
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utilized a basing-point scheme in order to stabilize price competition among
themselves. The Seventh Circuit characterized this arrangement as a conspir-
acy, a present violation of the Sherman Act." The court went on to find,
however, that the unilateral adoption of basing-point systems by individual
firms could also be prohibited as long as those firms were aware that others
were adopting similar practices. The court reasoned that the temptation to-
ward collusive conduct was too great, and that pricing systems of this kind,
even if' unilateral at the start, represented the first steps toward a conspiracy.
"A major purpose of [the FTC] Act," the court concluded, "was to enable the
Commission to restrain practices as 'unfair' which, although not yet having
grown into Sherman Act dimensions would most likely do so if left unre-
strained."' Thus there is significant precedent allowing the Commission to
attack incipient violations of the Sherman Act.
B. Incipient Clayton Act violations
It is now settled that Section 5 will reach incipient violations of the
Clayton Act as well as those of the Sherman Act. For many years, however,
there had been doubt as to whether this was the case. This doubt stemmed
from the legislative history of the two statutes. The chief concern of the Con-
gress in 1914 was to supplement and reinforce the Sherman Act. To this end
the FTC Act was passed with the express purpose of reaching incipient Sher-
man Act violations. The Clayton Act was passed with a similar motive. It
enumerated certain trade practices that were thought especially likely to result
in monopolies, and explicitly forbade them. The Clayton Act was subsidiary to
the Sherman Act, a fact reflected in its title as "an act to supplement existing
laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies."' As a result, it does not
necessarily follow, from the fact that Congress intended Section 5 to reach
incipient Sherman Act violations, that. it also intended the section to reach
incipient violations of the Clayton Act. It can be argued that the use of Sec-
tion 5 to supplement a statute which itself is supplementary should not be
made without some support in the legislative history, and it can be argued
further that no such support exists. One commentator has stated that refer-
ences to the incipiency concept, wherever they appeared in the legislative re-
cord, referred to Sherman Act violations exclusively."
8 ' 168 F.2d at 180.
82 Id. at 181, quoting FTC v. Cement institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948). See
also Keasbey R: Mattison Co. v. FTC. 159 F.2d 940, 951 (6th Cir. 1947); FTC v. Mar-
kin. 391 F. Stipp. 865, 870 (W.D. Mich. 1974), aff , 532 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1976) (in
context of subpoena enforcement). Cf. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 430
(1957) (after finding a conspiracy the Commission could then ban even the individual
use of a zone pricing system, if identical prices resulted).
" See Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
84 See Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policyrnaking, 76 YALE Li. 92,
99 n.53 (1966). -Foo much can be made of this point, however. The Clayton Act had
not yet passed Congress at the time that the FTC Act was being debated, and the
legislators may therefore have considered it still too hypothetical to discuss. CI: note
I 4 I infra.
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These doubts were reinforced by differences in the language of the two
statutes. The Sherman Act refers to present, existing conspiracies and
monopolies, whereas the Clayton Act looks to the future effect of certain
practices. In most of its sections the operative language of the Clayton Act.
bars only that conduct whose effect "may he substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly." 85
 The Clayton Act thus carries its
own internal standard of incipiency." To permit a Section 5 action for an
incipient Clayton Act violation would be to permit, in a sense, a theory of
"incipient incipiency." Such a theory would permit the Commission to reach
conduct far removed from the evils that Congress presumably had in mind
when it passed the Clayton Act. 87
Notwithstanding these questions, however, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the incipiency doctrine applies to the two statutes equally. This
conclusion was stated as early as the decision in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertis-
ing Service Co., 8 g quoted above, in which the majority said that Section 5
would reach practices "which, when full blown, would violate those Acts
...." 89
 justice Frankfurter, dissenting on other grounds, agreed that "[t]he
Federal Trade Commission Act was designed, doubtless, to enable the Com-
mission to nip in the bud practices which, when full blown, would violate the
Sherman or Clayton Act.""" For a variety of reasons, however, this case was
not thought to settle the issue. The opinion was not clearly reasoned and, in
any event, involved an incipient violation of only the Sherman Act. References
to the Clayton Act were therefore dictum."'
The issue was squarely faced and resolved in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co."2
This case involved a "franchised dealer program" offered by Brown Shoe. The
company made available to selected retailers a package of services, including
85 See, e.g., Clayton Act §§ 3, 7; 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1976).
88
 Congress intended for the Clayton Act to halt the creation of trusts and
monopolies "in their incipiency and before consummation ...." S. REP. No. 608, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1914). This report was construed in United States v. E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. (DuPont/GM), 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
" 7
 The theory had been sharply criticized in the literature for this reason,
both before and after it was expressly adopted by the Supreme Court. See Howrcy,
Interplay of Unfair Competition and Antitrust Doctrine Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 12
IDEA 119 (1968); Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1961); Note, The
Attack on Trading Stamps, 57 GEO. L.J. 1082 (1969). As the law has developed, how-
ever, the theory of incipient Clayton Act violations does not appear to rely on the kind
of attenuated two-step analysis that the phrase "incipient. incipiency" implies. See text
at note 108 infra.
" 344 U.S. 392 (1053).
" Id. at 394-95.
88 Id. at 400-01.
See 344 U.S. at 397. It is possible that both references were dictum, and
that the Court viewed the respondents' practices as a present restraint of trade, a
violation of the letter of the Sherman Act. The opinion is quite opaque on this point.
Compare 344 U.S. at 395 (practice "falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act")
with id. at 400 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Commission [had] not found any Sherman
Law violation").
"' 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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store layouts and plans for construction, the advice of sales representatives,
and low-cost insurance policies. In return the company demanded that the
retailers handle Brown Shoe products exclusively, except as to product lines
that the company did not itself provide." 3
 These arrangements were
exclusive-dealing contracts which would be prohibited under Section 3 of the
Clayton Act. if they threatened "substantially to lessen competition." Such a
showing could not be made, however, since Brown Shoe, despite its plans to
expand its franchise program, thus far had involved too few dealers to effect
this anti-competitive result. The Commission therefore sued under Section 5
on an incipiency theory, and the Supreme Court accepted its position:
We reject the argument that proof of this § 3 element [present
likelihood of substantial harm to competition] must be made for ...
our cases hold that the Commission has power under § 5 to arrest
trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to
an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of'
the antitrust laws. 14
Thus the Court in Brown Shoe resolved the doubts concerning the applicability
of the incipiency theory to Clayton Act violations.
C. How close must the violation be?
To say that Section 5 reaches incipient violations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts is useful, but it only begins the analysis. There remains the ques-
tion of what constitutes an "incipient" violation, or, stated differently, of how
close to the completed violation a respondent must be before Section 5 will
apply. The answer to this question is still by no means clear, but certain
guidelines and reference points have emerged.
As one such guideline, it seems to be established that no actual and pres-
ent harm to competition must be shown. This rule is clearly appropriate in
cases where the completed violation itself would be a per se offense. Since a
price-fixing conspiracy is illegal without showing its effect on competition, for
example, an incipient conspiracy of this nature should also be illegal without
showing present adverse effects.•'' Sonic support for this proposition may be
gleaned from Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC. 96
 There a present conspir-
acy among the conduit manufacturers was shown to exist. 97
 In concluding
that the unilateral adoption of delivered-pricing systems also would violate
Section 5 on an incipiency theory, however, the Seventh Circuit did not make
reference to the history of price-fixing." Some additional support for the
" 3 hi. at 317-18.
"' Id. at 322 (alternative ground) (footnote omitted). See also Racier v. Balfour,
440 F.2d 469, 472 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971) (dictum); Lippa's, Inc. v.
Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Stipp. 182, 188 (D. Vt. 1969) (dictum).
95
 This rule would still permit an exception, if one seemed desirable, for con-
duct that threatens an antitrust violation but still has so many other beneficial charac-
teristics that the agency desires not to invoke the per se standard.
" 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), gird,  336 U.S. 596 (1949).
97 Id. at 181.
98 See id. at 180-81.
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proposition may he found by analogy to those cases challenging conduct simi-
lar to that which is forbidden by a specific provision of the antitrust laws."
These cases generally have held that the Section 5 action should adopt. the
same burden of proof' that is required by the statute serving as a model, and
should proceed on a per se theory whenever the underlying statute is also per
se. 1 1W
Even where the completed violations would not be a per se offense, how-
ever, no showing of present harm to competition should be required. The
very purpose of the incipiency doctrine was, after all, to reach undesirable
conduct before it had resulted in public injury. It. would be self-defeating to
require a demonstration of that injury before finding a violation; such a rule
would be contrary to the intent of Congress."' In reaching this conclusion it
is necessary to distinguish between what the Commission actually does as a
matter of practice, and what it is required to do as a matter of law. One
commentator writing in 1960 noted that the Commission had never brought a
Section 5 case without alleging harm to competition. "'l It does riot follow
that such allegations are legally required, and at least one court has concluded
that they arc not. In a predatory pricing case, although finding actual injury,
the Sixth Circuit. made the following observation:
The fact that the sales were not greatly below cost does not aid the
petitioner. It was not necessary that. the evidence show that. Schanzer
[t.he target company and sole competitor] suffered loss ....The pur-
pose of the Federal Trade Commission Act is to prevent potential
injury by stopping unfair methods of competition in their incip-
iency.'
" 9
 These cases are discussed in text at notes 156-60 infra.
"" See, e.g., Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2(1 Cir. 1962) (solicitation
of discriminatory promotional consideration should be per se illegal, since the granting
of it would be). See also I n re Perpetual Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (FTC 1978),
dismissed due Jo supervening legislation (1979) (Clayton Act's per se rule against inter-
locking directorates adopted in an action based on Section 5, even though the Clayton
Act appeared to be technically inapplicable since it contained an exception for banks).
"' This conclusion is supported by the following exchange:
SENATOR McCUMBER. IA complainant] would have to prove sonic kind
of a result from that unfair competition. What result would he have to
establish under the provisions of [this] bill? Would he n ot have to prove
the fact that the result was such as to destroy the competition entirely, to
destroy his competitor, and thereby create a monopoly
SENATOR NEWLANDS. I presume the Senator would not contend that
the result must be proven if we prove that this practice was indulged in
with the intent to injure or destroy.
SENATOR McCUMBER.. ...No; I simply say that you would have to al-
lege the inevitable result of that competition, and to prove it, or else you
would have to allege that it had accomplished such results. One of those
two things must he done.
51 Corso. REC. 12217 (1914).
Howrev, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
as an Arailrust Law, 5 ANTrritusT BULLETIN 161, 178 (1960).
1 " Eli.	 & Co. v. FTC. 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944) (citation omit-
ted).
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The Commission therefore should not be required to demonstrate actual in-
jury to competition to establish an incipient violation of one of the antitrust
laws.
If the Commission need not show any present injury, however, one must
still ask what it does have to show. How close and how foreseeable must the
completed violation be? An answer to this question may be gained by compar-
ing the Section 5 standard of incipiency with the Clayton Act's reference to
conduct that may substantially lessen competition. The Supreme Court. has
held that the Clayton Act test involves something akin to a "probability" that
the forbidden result will occur:
It is to be observed that §, 2(a) does not require a finding that the
discriminations in price have in fact had an adverse effect on com-
petition. The statute is designed to reach such discriminations "in
their incipiency," before the harm to competition is effected. It is
enough that they "may" have the prescribed effect. But. ... the
use of the word "may" was not to prohibit discriminations having
"the mere possibility" of those consequences, but to reach those
which would probably have the defined effect on competition."'
The Clayton Act's "probability" standard, therefore, can be a useful starting
point in determining the scope of the incipiency standard.
The probability of a forbidden result occurring, however, is not . a wholly
satisfactory focus for the FTC Act. The Clayton Act gives the Commission
considerable latitude in predicting future events, but it appears that the Sec-
tion 5 incipiency test will confer still more latitude and will allow the banning
of conduct whose anti-competitive effects are still further away from fruition.
This was made clear in the Brown Shoe case, where the company's dealer-
franchising program was struck clown under Section 5 even though it could
not be reached under Section 3 of the Clayton Act.'" Two commentators
have attempted to characterize the relevant legal standard in light of these
events, They conclude that the appropriate incipiency standard under Section
5 lies somewhere between a "probability" and "reasonable possibility" that the
violation will come about.'"
The decided cases seem consistent with this proposed formula. The incip-
ient conspiracy cases, such as the alternative holding in Triangle Conduit, are
well within its boundaries. It did not require any great leap of faith to con-
clude that companies utilizing parallel pricing formulas that facilitated collu-
sion one clay actually might begin to collude. The incipient monopoly involved
in the Muller case was similarly close to fruition. Only one competitor then
survived in the industry, and he was being demonstrably injured by the pred-
atory pricing practices at issue. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co."'
Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945) (citation
omitted). Similarly, cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act have held that the word
"may- refers to probabilities rather than certainties. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v.
United Stales, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1963).
"5 See discussion at notes 121-23 infra.
1 "" See MacIntyre & Volhard, The Federal Trade Commission and Incipient Unfair-
ness. 4 l Geo. WASH, L. Rev. 407. 422 (1973).
344 U.S. 392-93 (1953).
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involved more tenuous inferences. There four companies held among them-
selves some 75 percent of the market for the advertising films that were
shown in movie theaters. Their contracting practices were prohibited as an
incipient violation of the Sherman Act. Since no one firm held a great market.
share, however, and since there was no evidence of collusion from which a
shared monopoly could be predicted, the Court's result probably could not
have been reached under the kind of incipiency test that was used in the
Clayton Act. Finally, Brown Shoe involved facts that stretch even the MacIntyre
& Volhard formula to its limits. Brown Shoe as a whole accounted for annual
sales of only about $111 million in an industry of $1.8 billion. Since little
significant vertical foreclosure had yet taken place, it appears that the Section
5 incipiency test in fact reached conduct that involved little more than a
reasonable possibility of eventually resulting in a substantial lessening of com-
petition.'"
In reviewing these cases one is struck by the extent to which, as a practi-
cal matter, the standard of proof for incipiency charges is procedural rather
than substantive. The appeals courts appear to give a close and searching
review if they think that the Commission's own investigation was too brief or
conclusory. At the same time, however, they appear to give the Commission
considerable latitude once they arc convinced that it has conducted a
thorough investigation.'" Thereafter they - are hesitant to upset. its expert
judgment as to the business consequences that. may be expected front certain
conduct. The importance of this factor may he inferred from Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Motion Picture Advertising, a case in which
he believed the Commission had not pronounced a sufficiently articulated or
ream:it -led conclusion. Justice Frankfurter observed:
The Commission has been content to rest. on its conclusion that re-
spondent's exclusive contracts unreasonably restrain competition and
tend to monopoly. If judicial review is to have a basis for function-
ing, the Commission must do more than pronounce a conclusion by
111h1 It might he thought that Brown Shoe does not illustrate the outer limits of
the incipiency doctrine in general, but instead reflects the particularly loose standard
of "incipient incipiency - that arises when the threatened violation is of the Clayton
rather than the Sherman Act. The case law is 1101 wholly clear on the point, but it
seems more probable that the Court applied the ordinary one-step test of incipiency.
The Court observed that Brown's program "obviously conflicts with the central policy
of § 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take away freedom of purchaser
to buy in an open market." 384 U.S. at 321. The Court's language suggests a direct
threat to this business standard, rather than the indirect. threat of an incipient violation
of that standard. Further, the Court. noted that. "[w]e reject the argument that proof of
this § 3 element [threatened harm to competition] must be made .... Id. at 322. Thus
the Court appears to have dispensed with the Clayton Act's own incipiency test al-
together before applying the Section 5 test, rather than combining them, as it easily
could have done, in a reference to "incipient violations of this § 3 element." In short,
therefore, the concept of "incipient incipiency" is a misnomer, preserved in the litera-
ture for its force as a bon mot rather than fOr its utility as a term of analysis.
L" This is consistent with the congressional intent. See 51 CONG. REc. 11108
(1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands) (thorough administrative hearings, rather than
judicial review, were best safeguard against arbitrary action).
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way of fiat and without explication. This is not a tribunal for inves-
tigating an industry. Analysis of practices in the light of definable
standards of illegality is for the Commission. It is for us to determine
whether the Commission has correctly applied the proper standards
and thus exhibited that familiarity with competitive problems which
the Congress anticipated the Commission would achieve from its ex-
perience."n
Presumably, had the Commission further elaborated on its reasoning in this
case, justice Frankfurter would have been more inclined to uphold its find-
ings.
In sum, although we do not yet have precise standards for determining
the existence of an incipient violation, enough guidelines have developed to
give substance to the concept. Actual and present harm to competition need
not be shown, but the eventuality of the predicted harm must. be
 more than a
mere speculation. While the predicted harm need not be probable, it must
exist as a "reasonable possibility." Within these parameters the findings of the
Commission will he upheld, provided that its opinion demonstrates that it has
attained the expected degree of Familiarity with the industry involved.
IV. CONDUCT VIOLATING THE SPIRIT OF
ONE OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Section 5 is not confined to conduct that actually violates, or that
threatens to violate, one of the other antitrust statutes. If it were limited to
this extent it would be a largely duplicative provision. The legislative purpose
instead assigned to Section 5 a broader role. It was to be an interstitial statute;
it was to till in the gaps in the other antitrust taws, to round them out and
make their coverage complete. In addition to overt violations, therefore, Sec-
tion 5 would reach closely similar conduct that violates the policy or "spirit"'"
of the antitrust laws, even though it may not come technically within its
terms."' An early commentator described this interstitial function in the fol-
lowing manner:
' 1 " FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 401 (1953).
See also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1972). But cf. National
Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S.
419 (1957). In the latter case the circuit court rejected a finding of incipient monopoli-
zation, despite considerable evidence in the record.
References to the "policy- or "spirit" of the antitrust laws arc often used
interchangeably in the cases. The latter term will be used in this article in order to
prevent confusion with the separate category of Section 5 actions that are based on
general public policy.
"2
 There are a number of reasons why the FTC Act can properly reach a
wider range of conduct than the other antitrust statutes. There are no criminal penal-
ties, treble damages, or private actions under it, and so conduct that has not previously
been held to be anticompetitive, or whose anticompetitive effects arc present but not
particularly serious, can be corrected without fear of inflicting excessive hardship.
Moreover, the agency itself has special characteristics that suit it to the exercise of a
broader authority than a district court would have. Through specialization its Commis-
sioners have developed expertise in the fields of business, law, and economics, and, in
addition, have the assistance of a staff of industrial organization economists.
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[T]he debates themselves suggest, what seems obvious from the text
of the Act, that it was the Congressional intention to confer on the
Commission, subject to court review, the duty of giving a detailed
content to the general principle embodied in the phrase . ['unfair
methods of competition'], and to employ, in fulfilling this duty, not
only the rules and precedents established by the courts at common
law and under previous statutes, but the technique of reasoning by
analogy and upon principle, with which jurists are familiar. "a
This early interpretation survives without substantial change in the modern
commentary. " 4 The cases have likewise been explicit in adopting the view
that violations of the spirit of the antitrust laws, will constitute a cause of ac-
tion under Section 5. Brown Shoe, for example, noted that the "broad power
of the Commission is particularly well established with regard to trade prac-
tices which conflict with basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even
though such practices may not actually violate these laws." 115
As with most general principles, however, the mere recognition of this
theory is not of great help. The theory first must be given concrete meaning
" 3 C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, p. 36 (1924).
14 One author recently noted: "The Federal Trade Commission Act spans an
archipelago of condemnatory practices and not all of them by any means are cogniza-
ble under other statutes. Nevertheless, other acts, and the antitrust acts in particular,
form a skeleton for much of Section 5." J. VON KALINOWSKI, 16E BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE. REGULATION § 43.04 (1976). Areeda and Turner
have taken a position somewhat to the contrary, suggesting that Section 5 will not
reach significantly beyond other antitrust statutes. "Nothing prevents [the Sherman.
and Clayton Acts] from working their own condemnation of practices violating their
basic policies." P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI - I:Rum: LAW 11 307b (1978); see also id. at 'V
307f. It should be noted that this position does not actually differ greatly from the
formula suggested in the text. Both agree that Section 5 ought to reach the spirit of
the other laws. The difference lies only in the reasoning. Areeda and Turner would
say that the statutes themselves, when properly construed, should include their under-
lying spirit as well, and so this can he reached through a Section 5 action to enforce
their letter, whereas this article suggests that Section 5 has a special interstitial role
which reaches beyond the original antitrust statutes. The later construction appears to
be best supported by the legislative history noted in the opening section of this article.
which revealed a clear congressional purpose to have Section 5 reach beyond the letter
of the Sherman Act. It is also supported by the Sherman Act case law, which has not
yet construed that statute as incorporating everything that might be included within its
spirit.
"5 384 U.S. at 321 (alternative ground). The practical operation of this theory,
and the use of the concept to reach actions that are analogous to established violations,
are both well illustrated in the following passage:
At the outset we must stress what we do not find present here. We recog-
nize that [the oppressive practice at issue] is not a tying arrangement....
But neither do we understand that either the Commission or the Court of
Appeals held that Lid was a tying scheme. What they did find was that the
central competitive characteristic was the same in both cases—the utiliza-
tion of economic power in one market to curtail competition in
another.... When conduct does bear the characteristics of recognized an-
titrust violations it becomes suspect, and the Commission may properly
look to cases applying those laws for guidance.
Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965).
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through the accretion of case law. In this category of Section 5 actions one
question in particular stands out. How similar to a recognized offense must
conduct be before it will be held to violate the spirit of the antitrust laws? This
question will be addressed through a review of the decided cases. Cases based
on the Sherman and Clayton Acts again will be examined separately, since, as
we shall see, the Clayton Act poses some special problems of statutory con-
struction.
A. The Spirit of the Sherman Act
First, then, the Sherman Act. Cases involving violations of the spirit of
this statute may be divided into two general classes, and discussion of them
likewise will he divided into two sections. The first section will consider the
"core" cases and the relatively straightforward applications of the theory. The
second section will turn to the more difficult cases that have invoked the spirit
of the Sherman Act in order to reach instances of conscious parallelism.
The basic cases in this area seem to proceed according to a relatively
simple principle. Legislatures genet -ally are concerned about results, and the
spirit or policy of a statute is generally defined by the ends it seeks to attain.
Hence a particular course of conduct. may be said to violate the spirit of the
Sherman Act—and so to constitute an unfair method of competition under
Section 5—if it tends to bring about the same kind of consequences that the
Sherman Act was intended to prevent.'"
The use of this criterion is best illustrated in the so-called "TBA cases" of
the mid-1960's. The cases grew out of marketing arrangements for "tires, bat-
teries, and accessories, -
 staples of the retail gas station trade. Gas stations
often are leased or franchised by the major oil companies, but operated by
independent. businessmen. For many years the station operators had been able
to buy TBA products from suppliers of their own choosing. The principal tire
manufacturers then realized that they could improve their market penetration
by enlisting the patent oil companies in an effort. to sell their brands to the
station operators. Each major tire manufacturer approached an oil company
and offered it a commission on all sales made to that company's outlets. The
oil companies in turn pressured the outlets to buy their tire requirements in
the recommended brand exclusively. No overt tie was made between a
"" Conduct meeting these tests may he less anticompetitive than that forbid-
den by the Sherman Act, since i he lesser penalties attached to violation of' the FTC Act
make it appropriate to teach a wider range of' business practices. Some substantive
analogy to a Sherman Act violation, however, if only an attenuated one, would still
stern to he required. It might he argued that the spirit of the Sherman Act extends
further than this and will justify any decision that the Commission makes as a result of
balancing the costs of a particular practice against the justification for its use, on the
theory that this process is analogous to the application of the Sherman Act's Rule of
Reason. That analogy relates primarily to a matter ()I' adjudicatory procedure, how-
ever, rather than to the "competitive characteristics'' referred to in Atlantic Refining,
supra note 115. Cases based on a balancing of the equities would therefore seem best
considered under the heading of the Commission's power to define public policy,
which will be discussed in a later section.
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dealer's purchase of the designated tires and his ability to retain his lease or to
obtain gasoline. A threat to this effect was, however, implicit in the relative
situation of the parties. The gas station operators knew that. they were depen-
dent. upon the continued good will of the oil companies, that their leases were
short-term and might. not be renewed, and that it was in their best interest to
purchase the named tires. The FTC considered this situation to be so inher-
ently coercive that it was functionally equivalent. to a rigid tying arrangement.
The Commission accordingly determined that the practices violated Section 5,
and issued appropriate cease-and-desist orders.
The reviewing courts affirmed. In so doing they found that the practices
at. issue violated the goals of the Sherman Act. in two respects. First, the prac-
tices produced the same kind of effect. on competitors —in this case market
foreclosure—that. the law was intended to prevent. "Within seven months
after the agreement Goodyear had signed up 96% and 98%, respectively, of
Atlantic's dealers in two of the three areas assigned to 4. -1 ' 7 Second, it was
recognized that the practices produced a similarly forbidden effect-
coercion—on the individual dealers involved:
A man operating a gas station is hound to be overawed by the great
corporation that is his supplier, his banker, and his landlord. When
he hears that Shell will benefit from his patronage of sponsored
'IBA outlets, the velvet glove of request has within it the mailed fist
of command."
In short, the practices used in 'FBA sales brought. about end results of the
type that the Sherman Act. was intended to prevent, and so were condemned
as violations of the spirit. of that statute.
Although this use of Section 5 may he relatively simple in principle, it
can sometimes prove unexpectedly difficult to apply in practice. Legislation
is often designed to serve more than one end. In that event one must decide
which of several legislative goals is the one whose spirit should be taken as the
basis for an action under the 'FTC Act.. The situation of multiple goals may
arise in any of several forms. The legislature may have enacted a statute with
parallel goals in mind, such as with separate and independent purposes for
the new law to serve. The legislature may have acted with conflicting
goals in mind, so that one part of the voting majority supported the statute
L' 7 Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 366 (1965). Thus the Court did
not treat this situation as a per .w violation, even though it also refused to embark
upon a full-scale economic analysis of competitive effect":
Upon considering the destructive effect on commerce that would result
from the widespread use of these contracts by major oil companies and
suppliers, we conclude that the Commission was clearly justified in refusing
the participants an opportunity to offset these evils by a showing of
economic benefit to themselves.
Id. at 371. For further indications that a per se test was not used see Shell Oil Co. v.
FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 191)6), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
I" Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S 1002 (1967). See also FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 229 (1968) (system is
"inherently coercive").
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for one reason, and another part. for a different reason. Or the legislature
may have visualized concentric goals, in the sense that a provision was passed
for a number of reasons of increasing breadth and generality.
The case of concentric goals seems most likely to raise issues for Section
5 jurisprudence. Situations of parallel or conflicting goals do not create seri-
ous conceptual problems," 9 and may not in fact he encountered with great
frequency. Concentric goals, on the other hand, underlie every provision of
every statute that is passed. Any statutory term can he described in a variety
of ways, as serving a variety of values arranged along a continuum of increas-
ing breadth and sweep. Thus Section 2 or the Sherman Act, for example, is
intended to prevent the practice of monopolization; to prevent the undue
growth of corporations through sharp trading practices; to slow the pace of
asset concentration; to prevent the concentration of socio-political power; and
t.o help create a just. society. Each of these things is in some sense "the goal" of
Section 2.
It must be clear, however, that not all of these legislative purposes can be
invoked in an action under the FTC Act. Senator Sherman might have de-
scribed his ultimate goal as the creation of a just society, but this cannot be a
basis for defining the spirit of that statute. If it were, the Commission would
be able to frame any public policy that it believed was wise, could assert that
this policy tended toward the creation of a just society, could point out that
the policy served the same end as the Sherman Act, and could then enforce
compliance with that policy under Section 5 on the ground that it was a
means of carrying out the spirit of the Sherman Act.
An initiative based on the creation of a just society is the extreme case. It
would not require extensive analysis to conclude that this was not a proper
use of Section 5. The proposition serves, however, to illustrate a problem that
frequently arises in more subtle forms. There are many possible Section 5
actions which would implement legislative goals somewhat. narrower than the
achievement of a just society, but still broader than the basic letter of the
statute.''" The Commission might consider a no-fault monopoly action, for
example, enforcing the Sherman Act's underlying goal of eliminating
monopoly power, but escaping from the restriction of that statute to active
forms of monopolization. The Commission might also consider similar initia-
tives based on the spirit of the Clayton Act. It might, for example, challenge a
"" Parallel goals each reflect an independent legislative purpose, and so either
of them may properly he the basis for a Section 5 action. In the case of conflicting
goals, on the other hand, a legislative majority could not normally have been found for
either goal, and so a Section 5 action should be confined to those points on which a
legislative majority can affirmatively be shown to exist. This often may be only the
letter of the statute, plus more or less technical corrections.
12" It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the examples given in this and
the following paragraphs are only examples. They are stylized hypothetical cases cho-
sen in the hope of illustrating and clarifying the underlying legal theory. Whether
such cases should actually be resolved in the manner suggested when viewed amid the
complexities of the real economy is a different problem, and one that would call for
far more extensive analysis of the business consequences a n d of the individual legisla-
tive histories than has been given here.
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large but purely conglomerate merger on the theory that it violated the Sec-
tion 7 policy against excessive concentrations of social and political power,
even though the. merger was unlikely to bring about. any reduction in the
price competition that is the apparent focus of the Clayton Act. Each of these
initiatives would utilize a Section 5 spirit theory to vindicate an unquestioned
goal of the underlying antitrust legislation. The issue is whether that goal is a
proper basis for an FTC case, or whether it instead lies too far removed along
the spectrum of concentric legislative ends.
This issue has not been squarely addressed by the courts, and so we do
not have authoritative criteria for determining the limits of the spirit theory.
An approximate formulation would nonetheless seem possible. Concentric
goals would appear to be relevant to Section 5 if they fall within a range of
"reasonably central- legislative purposes. This test. should be applied through
an examination of the letter of the underlying statute.
The truly central legislative purposes will ordinarily be those that are
expressly mentioned as the statute's key concepts. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act., for example, has two such key concepts. lt is concerned (1) with combina-
tions (2) that, tend to restrict competition. The spirit theory of Section 5 can
therefore be used to expand or modulate those key concepts in light of the
special characteristics of an FTC action.'' Section 5 can expand the defini-
tion of "combination" to reach anticompetitive situations that otherwise might
escape, for example, or it can reduce the quantum of present harm to com-
petition that must be shown in order to constitute a violation t'41 . the Act.' 22
The spirit theory cannot be used, however, where it would directly contradict
one of the key elements of the statute, or where it would be based on an
underlying legislative goal that is not reflected in the key elements at all. Such
an expansive course would not have enough limiting mechanisms to ensure
satisfactory adherence to the congressional intent.
To illustrate, a Section 5 action premised on a theory of no-fault (or
"no-conduct") monopolization would probably be jurisdictionally permissible,
since this would involve only a modulation of the Sherman Act's existing ban
against firms that "monopolize" a line of commerce. 12" An action challenging
a conglomerate merger on the basis of its size alone, however, would probably
not be permissible. Such a theory would directly contradict, rather than
merely modify, the limitation of the Clayton Act to mergers that threaten a
substantial lessening of competition.
The conclusions reached by examining the statute for its key elements
should be cross-checked against, the legislative history. This examination may
121 See note 112 supra.
122
 Section 5 has already been used to reduce the quantum of harm below that
which would he required by the Clayton Act. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316, 321 (1903). A similar holding might be found for the Sherman Act as well. See
I...C. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2(1 I, 8-9 (7th Cir. 1971). There the respondent's
conduct resembled acts of monopolization, although they were anticompetitive to a
lessur degree than might have been required in a pure Sherman Act case.
123 This assumes that the use of the active verb "monopolize - does not itself
indicate an affirrnat.ive desire to limit the statute to cases of active misconduct.
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reveal that a major goal was simply omitted from explicit mention in the de-
tails of the statute, or, conversely, that what appears to be a key element is in
fact of little importance. Our primary focus should remain on the letter of the
statute, however, since the inclusion of a term there offers a more objective
measure of its importance to the Congress. Through those means an action
based on the spirit of the Sherman Act should be kept acceptably close to the
original legislative intent.
Thus far most "spirit" cases have involved relatively close analogies to the
letter of the Sherman Act, and hence have not actually tested the criteria for
reaching conduct in which the analogies are more remote. The spirit theory
has, however, been used to make at least one significant extension of this sort.
The extension came in the cases that have considered conscious parallelism.
These cases used Section 5 to modulate the concept of "combination or
conspiracy”—that is, the concept of conscious agreement—that appears in the
letter of the Sherman Act.
"Conscious parallelism - refers to the interdependent behavior on the
part of firms that, while not explicitly colluding, still take account of one
another's actions when making their business decisions. It is a pattern of con-
duct most often encountered in oligopolistic industries. 124 Of course, not all
forms of mutual awareness are undesirable. It is to be expected that. every
businessman will take some account. of his competitor's actions. In a fully-
developed case of conscious parallelism, however, the dialectic of actions
among the firms can be exceptionally detailed and subtle, and may amount. to
a system of sign language or silent communication. It may sometimes result in
coordinated pricing and output decisions that achieve supracompetitive profits
and thus may result in the anticompetitive consequences of collusion without
actual conspiracy. 125 Conscious parallelism might best be combatted under a
theory of incipient conspiracy, relying on the Cement Institute and Triangle
Conduit cases discussed in the previous section.'" Such conduct also might
be reached, however, on a theory that the practice violates the spirit. of the
Sherman Act. Conscious parallelism can result in many of the same evils that
overt, collusion would bring, and therefore can he found contrary to the spirit.
of Section 1. 127
12.1 For a well-balanced discussion of the relati onship between market structure
and economic performance See INDUSTRIA], CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H.
(::oLoscnmin et al. , eds., 1974).
125 See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRusT at 340-42 (1977).
See also Ill P. AREF.DA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 840 et seq. (1978) (although
questioning whether suitable remedies will often be available).
12 " If the evidence of direct contact among the firms is sufficient, and the
parallelism of their behavior sufficiently clear, the situation might be reached under
the letter of the Sherman Act, on the theory that a tacit agreement among competitors
can he deduced from the circumstantial evidence of their economic conduct. See, e.g.,
American"Tobacco Co. v. United Stales, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946); Wall Products
Co. n•. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Stipp. 295, 316 (N.D. Cal. 1971): R. POSNER,
AS"IITRUST LAW—AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE at 55-71 (1976). The alternative theories
reviewed here, however, can allow the Commission to reach patterns of conduct that
arc less fully developed, or on which the quantum of available evidence is less.
1 " 7 For a more detailed treatment of these issues, see Note, Oligopoly and Section
5 of the Federal Trade Cornmission Ad, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rev. 113 (1971). This
article also contains an excellent general review of the law under Section 5.
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Some support for this proposition .
 may be found in one of the first cases
10 be decided under Section 5, FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. 128 Beech-Nut
involved an elaborate system of resale price maintenance, instigated by the
manufacturer but enforced by jobbers, dealers, and other parties at all levels
of the distribution system. Some "contract" in restraint of trade, either express
or implied, was presumably required to harmonize the efforts of so many
parties. The Commission, however, accepted a stipulation to the effect that
neither a contract nor an agreement existed. It charged Beech-Nut only with
the unilateral adoption and enforcement of the system. The court of appeals
reversed the resulting conviction, holding that unilateral conduct was pro-
tected by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Colgate.'"
The Supreme Court reversed again, upholding the original charges
'against Beech-Nut. It agreed that the Commission's stipulation had precluded
a Sherman Act charge, but. rested its decision on the underlying policy of that
statute. The Sherman Act is not involved here except in so far as it shows a
declaration of public policy to he considered in determining what are the un-
fair methods of competition, which the Federal Trade Commission is empow-
ered to condemn and suppress." 131 The Court determined that the spirit of
the Sherman Act condemned parallel actions in restraint of trade, even in the
absence of agreement. The Court then examined the facts and found "sup-
pression of the freedom of competition by methods in which the company
secures the cooperation of its distributors and customers, which are quite as
effectual as agreements express or implied intended to accomplish the same
purpose." 131 The Court therefore upheld the Commission's finding of an
illegal restraint of trade.
It is possible to make too much of this decision. It may be argued that.
the decision should be confined to the unusual procedural context in which it
arose. The Supreme Court clearly believed that. there was an agreement in
restraint of trade, and the opinion can be explained as merely an effort to
find a way around the Commission's tactical error in accepting a stipulation
that there was none. One author accordingly concluded that. Beech-Nut was an
aberration, and suggested that the case does not establish a general rule under
which Section 5 can be used to extend the reach of the Sherman Act.'"
Beech-Nut was to be cited again by the Supreme Court, however, and in
an important conscious-parallelism case. In FTC v. Cement Institute "" the
Court found ample evidence of conspiracy among the cement. companies
which had adopted delivered-pricing systems. Then, in a footnote, the Court
made the following observation:
128 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
In
 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
13 " 257 U.S. at 453.
Id. at 455.
132 See Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 ANTITRusT BULLETIN 161, 168 (1960).
133
 333 U.S. 683 (1948); sec text at note 46 supra.
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While we hold that the Commission's findings of combination were
supported by evidence, that does not mean that existence of a 'com-
bination' is an indispensible ingredient of an 'unfair method of com-
petition' under the Trade Commission Act. 134
This reference presumably leaves the door open to a conscious-parallelism
action tinder Section 5.
B. The Spirit of the Clayton Act
Just as with the Sherman Act, it is also well settled, as a matter of general
principle, that Section 5 will reach conduct that violates the spirit of the
Clayton Act. "It is, of course, well established that the Commission has broad
power to apply § 5 to reach transactions which violate the standards of the
Clayton Act, although technically not subject to the Act's prohibitions."'"
When descending from general principles to specifics, however, the situation
becomes more complicated.
The problem is that it is difficult to identify the spirit—the underlying
legislative purpose—behind any particular provision of the Clayton Act. This
is so because the Clayton Act is a narrower and more focused statute than the
Sherman Act. It enumerates specific forms of conduct which, under specific
circumstances, will be illegal. Congress obviously intended to prohibit that
conduct. The question then arises, however, of whether this enumeration
exhausted the legislative purpose, so that conduct generally similar to a
Clayton Act violation, but falling outside the specific provisions of the statute,
was intended to be permissible. In brief, the problem is when to apply the
maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 136
I. The General Rule
There is no single answer to this question. The issue instead must be
separately resolved for each term of the Clayton Act. In some provisions
Congress drew a precise line between legal and illegal conduct while in other
provisions it merely identified particularly flagrant abuses and declared that
those, at least, were improper. Two examples will illustrate this distinction.
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act 137 (a part of the Clayton Act) pro-
hibits, under certain circumstances, the charging of discriminatory prices for
commodities "of like grade and quality."' 38 It is clear that this term exhausts
the legislative intent on the subject. There does not exist a more general legis-
lative purpose opposed to all price differences, on the basis of which one
1 " 1 Id. at 721 n.19, citing Beech-Nut. But cf. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, Dkt.
No. 78-1757 (9th Cit . .) (May 9, 1980).
15 United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271,
279 n.7 (1975).
'I"' It should be noted that this maxim is increasingly considered unreliable. See
National Petroleum Refiners' Ass . n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
137 15 U.S.C.	 I3(a) (1976).
13" Id.
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could bring a Section 5 action challenging price discrimination between goods
of different grade or quality. By contrast, however, other terms of the Act do
not exhaust the legislative intent. Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act 139
forbids the granting, but not the receipt, of discriminatory promotional
allowances. It is clear in this case that there is a general policy against dis-
criminatory allowances. An action may therefore be brought under Section 5,
enforcing the spirit of this legislation, to reach the buyer who induces the
grant of such allowances to himself.
The remainder of this section will attempt to trace the ways in which the
decided cases have categorized the various terms of the Clayton Act. It also
will attempt to frame a general rule of statutory construction that can be
applied to sections of the Act that have not yet been litigated. At some risk of
getting ahead of our story, that rule can be summarized as follows: "There is
a presumption that the specific terms of the Clayton Act do not exhaust the
legislative intent, and a Section 5 action may normally be brought to halt
analogous 140 conduct that is not expressly barred by the Act. This presump-
tion can be rebutted by reference either to the legislative history or to the
internal logic of the statutory term at issue, but the reasons for holding the
legislative intent to be exhausted must affirmatively appear." The task of jus-
tifying this rule of construction will begin with the legislative history of the
Clayton Act in general, and it is to that history that we now turn.
2. The Legislative History
The Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts were passed by the
same Congress, and within two weeks of one another. It is therefore clear that
to some extent they represent a coordinated legislative approach to the gen-
eral problem of trade restraints,'" and must to some extent be construed in
parrs materia. 142
 To say that the statutes must be construed together, however,
only begins the analysis. The relationship between them can be characterized
in either of two general ways. On the one hand it might he thought that they
represent a single program—a unified vision—and hence should he read to
minimize any overlap between them. Under this hypothesis a distinct "terri-
tory" would be allocated to each statute, and matters expressly regulated by
the Clayton Act would presumptively be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of
the FTC Act. On the other hand, however, it might. be
 said that the two
"" 15 U.S.C.
	 13(d) (1976).
"" The analogy presumably would he shown by the same tests used ni make
out a violation of the spirit of the Sherman Act.: (I) an analogous end result being
brought about: (2) in an area defined at a level of generality that makes it reasonably
central to the original statutory intent. See text at note 116 supra.
" 1
 Congressmen had both bills in mind when they were debating the FTC Act.
See, e.g., 51 Cuxc. REC. 12273 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); id. at 11867
(remarks of Senator Cummins); id. at 12030 (remarks of Senator Reed); id. at 11536
(remarks of Senator Lippitt).
I " See United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S.
271, 275-83 (1975); FTC v. Reed, 243 F.2d 308, 309 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 823 (1957).
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statutes represent two different approaches to the reform of the Sherman
Act, each backed by its own faction in the legislature, so that they would pro-
vide complementary rather than mutually-exclusive plans of antitrust en-
forcement.. In this event the limitations in the Clayton Act would not diminish
the independent reach of the FTC Act.
A review of the legislative history makes it clear that the second alterna-
tive is the correct one. The two statutes originated independently and pro-
ceeded through Congress in relative isolation from one another. They rep-
resented two distinct schools of thought as to the best method of antitrust
enforcement.'" One school, backed by Woodrow Wilson in the 1912 election
campaign, believed it was important to provide businessmen with clear stan-
dards of legal and illegal conduct. This group favored the specific prohibi-
tions of the Clayton Act."' A second faction believed that unfair conduct
was too protean in its shape ever to be captured by specific proscriptions.
Hence this group favored the more general language of Section 5. 1 "
These divergent approaches were harmonized, in the minds of the legis-
lators, by a simple device. The specific prohibitions of the Clayton Act were
taken as a listing of particularly pernicious forms of "unfair competition."
Congress withdrew these particular business practices from the discretion of
the Commission and expressly declared them to be illegal. Other business
practices, however, not specifically outlawed, remained subject to the Commis-
sion's judgment under the general authority of Section 5. As a result, the fact
that a practice falls close to, but outside of the Clayton Act creates no infer-
ence that Congress intended to permit it. 14"
A few quotations will illustrate how the relationship between the two stat-
utes was perceived. Congressman Covington, the principal manager for the
FTC bill in the House of Representatives,'" reported to his colleagues that
Section 5 "embraced within its broad and elastic scope all the specific practices
against which there had been prohibitions in the Clayton Bill."'" Senator
t' See 51 CON(:. REC. 15996-99 (1914) (remarks of Senator Chilton).
144 Cl'. note 21) supra. See also 51 CONG. Ric. 12935-38 (remarks of Senator
Reed).
"5 See note 23 supra. The advocates of Section 5 had, if anything. the upper
hand in the debates, and eventually converted President Wilson to their view. Thereaf-
ter lie virtually ignored the Clayton Act. See LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PRO-
GRESSIVE ERA at 72-73 (1954); Travers, Interlocks in Corporate Management and the Anti-
trust Laws, 46 TEx. 1.. Rcy, 819. 831 (1968).
"" Rather than casting the proposed rule of construction in terms of a special
presumption, it can therefore also he understood as one application of the general
principle that implied exemptions from the antitrust laws (here, exemptions from Sec-
tion 5) arc nol favored.
HT See 51 Conn. REC. 14939 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Stevens).
Si CONG. REC. 14927. Senator Clapp, also a member of the Conference
Committee, and speaking at a time when the proposed Clayton Act still contained
criminal sanctions. expressed the point in this way:
1 . 1.V1hile the definition of "unfair competition" is, I believe, broad and suffi-
cient if properly interpreted, what objection can there be to taking those
things which we all agree clearly fall within the purview of unfair competi-
tion and prohibiting them, declaring a violation of the prohibition to he a
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Chilton, one of the Senate managers of the Clayton Act., stated that "the Sen-
ate and 1-louse have adopted a' theory of handling those practices in competi-
tion which were not reached by the Sherman law; they condemned four of
them specifically [in the Clayton Act.] and all of them generally by section 5 of
the Trade Commission bill." 149 Indeed, Senator Newlands, the principal
sponsor of the FTC Act, was "near cavalier" 150 in his belief that the Clayton
Act was merely duplicative:
[The Judiciary Committee] can, if' it. chooses, taking the view
that is entertained by the Interstate Commerce Committee, conclude
that. section 5 covers all the various practices that in the common
vernacular are termed 'unfair competition,' and having come to that
conclusion, the Judiciary Committee can, if it chooses, leave out all
legislation with reference to specific practices which are today re-
garded as unfair competition, or they can put them in, according to
their pleasure. IS I
It can be seen, therefore, that the congressional understanding of the rela-
tionship between Section 5 and the Clayton Act was not one of mutual
crime. and seeking to punish the crime with a penalty? And to the extent
to which we define any particular offense we withdraw that question from
the judgment of the commission
* *
[T]hose things that may be made plain, upon which we are generally
agreed, should he prohibited. We should prohibit them, and then leave the
commission with that territory to work in which we are unable to cover by
Specific cases.
51 CONG. REc. 14257. 14259 (1914).
149 51 CONG. REC. 14226 (1914). Senator Reed had a similar perception:
... 1 want somebody to tell me why Congress should not specify that par-
ticular act and denounce it here and now as criminal. To do so will not
interfere with the trade commission; it will help the trade commission; it.
will not destroy its power; it will make the path certain and the remedy
complete. All you have clone is to provide a penalty ... which can be en-
forced without in any way interfering with the trade commission.
51 CONC.. REc. 14226 (1914). Some additional support for the proposition may be
found in the 1913 Cummins Report:
[O]ur legislation should	 recite certain known forms of combination and
declare them to be unlawful because in restraint of trade. With respect to
other forms, we should declare that if restraint is established the burden of
proof is upon the person or corporation involved to show that the restraint
is reasonable.
S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cc.mg., 3d Sess. at 12 (1913). This committee report antedates
the introduction of the FTC and Clayton Acts themselves, and so it is not formal
authority for the issue at hand. Since the report constituted the background study for
both statutes, however, see text at note 11 supra, it still has some weight. Although the
committee recommendations with respect to a revised burden of proof were not ac-
cepted, it appears significant that the report contemplates the coexistence of both gen-
eral and specific prohibitions. See also Rublee, The Original Plan and Early Histors of the
Federal Trade Commission, I I AcAn. Pot.. SCI. PROC. 666 (1926).
' 5 " Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing
Process (ye Redefinition, 7 V iLLANov A L. REV. 517, 537 (1962).
''' 51 CONG. Rec. 12030 (1914). For more reflective comments to the same
effect see 51 CONG. Rite. 1 1537 (1914) (colloquy between Senators Cummins and New-
lands).
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exclusivity. Rather, statements by congressmen responsible for the two acts
clearly indicate that the Clayton Act is a subset of Section 5, and its prohibi-
tions are a listing of some specific forms of "unfair competition." 152
This proposed rule of construction is confirmed by most of the cases that
have considered violations of the spirit of the Clayton Act. These cases will be
reviewed under (he remaining headings of this section. The discussion will
touch in sequence on: (1) the inducement of discriminatory promotional
allowances; (2) the issuance of subpoenas; (3) the ordering of divestiture in
merger cases; and (4) the elimination of the requirement for a "substantial
lessening of competition."'"
3. Inducement of Discriminatory Allowances
The best-known line of cases based on the spirit of the Clayton Act are
those which interpret Section 2(d). These are the cases which consider
whether a buyer may be prosecuted under Section 5 for inducing a seller to
grant him discriminatory promotional allowances. This particular conduct falls
outside of the letter of the Clayton Act. Section 2(d) only prohibits a seller
from granting discriminatory promotional allowances,'" and Section 2(f) only
152 The commentators generally have shared these congressional observations.
Professor Stone has probably best summed up the relationship between the FTC and
Clayton Acts:
Three principal factors led Congress to pass the Clayton Act in spite of the
relatively clear intention of the framers of the FTC Act and the Confer-
ence Committee that the phrase "unfair competition" was to embrace the
specific practices included in Sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act.
First, the legislative travels of the two bills were dissimilar. While the Fed-
eral Trade Commission bills originated in the commerce committees of the
Senate and House, the Clayton Act originated in the judiciary committees;
and when the Clayton bill was still in committee, the FTC bill was being
debated on the floor. Second, the Clayton hill originally, and for a long
period in its legislative travels, was a criminal bill, while the Trade Com-
mission bill was at all times a civil-administrative piece of legislation. Third,
and most important, Congress felt particularly strongly about certain un-
fair methods of competition. Senator Moses Clapp, one of the Clayton bill's
most forceful advocates, said succinctly that the four modes of competition
proscribed by the Clayton Act were specific examples of unfair competi-
tion.
A. S -roNE, ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 48 (Cornell Univ. Press,
1977). See also C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CommissioNt p. 27 (1924).
' 5 " Taken in combination, these lines of authority suggest that the Commission
has considerable latitude in enforcing the spirit of the Clayton Act. In reviewing the
cases one red herring should he given a decent burial. Respondents who are charged
with violating the spirit of the Clayton Act often retort with a Supreme Court citation
to the effect that the Commission cannot supply "what Congress has studiously omit-
ted." FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959). This is quite true as a
general proposition. Simplicity Pattern stands for the proposition only in the most
abstract terms, however, and it has no direct bearing on the propriety of most FTC
actions. The case is distinguishable in two respects. First, it was referring to the powers
of a court rather than to the powers of the Commission. Second, it involved an at-
tempt by a defendant to imply a defense in the Clayton Act, which is obviously a very
different matter from an attempt by the Commission to imply a particular cause of
action under the general authority expressly conferred by Section 5.
' 54 15 U.S.C.	 13(d) (1976).
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prohibits a buyer from inducing or receiving discriminations in price. ' 55 The
Commission and the courts have agreed, however, that the inducement of
excessive promotional allowances is contrary to the underlying spirit of the
statute. They have therefore held that such conduct. is a violation of Section 5.
This proposition was first established in the case of Grand Union Co. v.
FTC 'r,'
Grand Union was in many respects an uncomplicated case. It. was not
necessary to determine whether the spirit theory would empower the Com-
mission to announce a wholly new competition rule. A general legislative pol-
icy against discriminatory promotional allowances was apparent on the face of
Section 2(d), and thus a Section 5 action could be justified by an affirmatively
expressed spirit. of the Clayton Act rather than having to be implied by anal-
ogy in the face of legislative silence. The Second Circuit pitched its decision
on the safer, narrower ground that was available, and emphasized how small
an extension it was making:
Nor can we accept the notion the Commission is here legislating a
'new antitrust prohibition.' The practice itself is clearly proscribed by
§ 2(d); : . The Commission is not upsetting specific Congressional
policies; the proceedings did not 'circumvent the essential criteria of
illegality prescribed by the express prohibitions of the Clayton Act.'
No economic activity, once lawful, had been suddenly brought within
the prohibition of the antitrust. laws. Jurisdiction, perhaps, has been
expanded From the technical confines of § 2(d), but only fully to
realize the basic policy of the Robinson-Pat man Act, which was to
prevent abuse of buying power. ' 57
The appeals court's decision to permit Section 5 enforcement of the spirit of
the Clayton Act was therefore achieved through a cautious and wholly techni-
cal expansion of the scope of Section 2(d).' 58 Despite its limited holding,
Grand Union still attracted considerable adverse comment. The commentary
did not dispute the reasonableness of what was actually decided, but it clearly
foresaw, and was alarmed by, the potential teach of the underlying
	" 5
 15	 § 13(f) (1976).
25"
 300 I.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). The case had given rise to considerable com-
mentary when it was decided at the Commission level. See Alexander, Section 5 of the
FTC Act: A Deus ex Alachina in the Tragic Interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 12
SYRACUSE L. REV. 317 (1961); Rahl, Does Section 5 of the FTC Act Extend the Clayton Act?,
5 ANTri -RusT 533 (1960); Note, 49 Gro. L.J. 379 (1960); Note, 8 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 243 (1961).
157 300 F.2d at 98 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
' 5 " The narrowness of this initial decision was understood by Grand Union's
companion case, American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2(1 104, 11 I (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962). There the court expressly reserved the question of
whether Section 5 would reach an unsuccesVid attempt to induce the grant of improper
allowances. Id. The court observed that this would make a substantive rather than a
merely "technical" extension in the law, since there did not already exist a parallel
prohibition on the seller. Id. at 98.
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theory.' 5 " Such arguments, however, proved fruitless. Grand Union appears
to have been uniformly followed by later cases considering the same issues.'"
4. Issuance of Subpoenas
The issue that could be avoided in Grand Union was squarely presented
to the courts when they had to determine the scope of the FTC's subpoena
power. The courts were asked to imply a power that most certainly did not
appear in the Clayton Act. Both the Clayton Act and the FTC Act contain
sections dealing with procedural and housekeeping matters. Section 11 of the
Clayton Act.'" sets out procedures for hearings, cease-and-desist orders, en-
forcement by the court of appeals, and similar matters. This section, however,
does not. confer subpoena powers on the enforcement agencies. Such powers
were conferred by Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,'" but
only "for the purposes of this Act." When the FTC attempted to issue a sub-
poena in a Clayton Act proceeding, therefore, there was some question as to
the propriety of its action. There was nothing on the face of the two statutes
to affirmatively indicate that Congress intended them to be other than what
they appeared—two complete and separate sets of procedure. The inference
of subpoena power for a Clayton Act proceeding could be justified only on
the basis of an interpretation that the limitations of the Clayton Act did not
mark the outer boundaries of the legislative intent, and that they could there-
fore be overridden by Section 5. If such a presumption had to be made, the
courts were willing to make it. It appears that the circuit courts have uni-
formly endorsed this interpretation and have upheld the Commission's sub-
poena authority in actions brought solely under the Clayton Act.'"
' 59 See, e.g., Handler, Review of Antitriat Developments, 17 N.Y.B.A. RECORD
402-03 (1901) ("the specific acts of Congress in the antitrust field which the Commis-
sion administers (are thus made] essentially superfluous"). See also Handier, Recent An-
titrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75 (1961); 57 F.T.C. 382, 429 (1960) (Commit-. Tait
dissenting from original decision) ("too much supplement and too little bolster");
Casenote, 61 Coi.wi. L. REV. 291 (1961). This criticism tends to downplay the legisla-
tive history discussed above, however. The history shows that the Clayton Act was
intended to ensure that certain defined acts would be illegal, not that all other acts
would he legal.
I"" See, e.g.. Alterman Foods, Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1974); FTC v.
J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F. 2c1 687 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965); R.
H. NlacY & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d
184 (D.C. Cir. 1962). cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963); el: FTC v. Fred Meyer. Inc., 390
U.S. 341 (1968).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
" 2 15 U.S.C.	 49 (1976).
1 "" See, e.g., FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2c1 005 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925
(1957); Menzies v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'g 145 F. Stipp. 164 (1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957); FTC v. Reed, 243 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 823 (1957). But see FTC v. Rubin, 145 F. Stipp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd per
curiam, 245 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1957). The Popercruft decision is not to the contrary. See
United States v. Papercraft Corp., 540 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1976). There the court held that
the Commission. in imposing penalties for failure to divest an improper acquisition,
could assess only the fines provided by the Clayton Act rather than the larger fines
provided by the FTC Act. This decision was based, however, on the fact that the
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Although the subpoena cases demonstrate support for the proposed rule
of construction, they are not wholly conclusive on that question. Their value
as precedent. is diminished by two special considerations. First, they relate only
to a question of procedure, which is different from, and arguably less impor-
tant than, questions of substantive law as to which different rules of construc-
tion might apply.'" Second, the context of these decisions was such that a
court could deny that. it was framing general rules of construction at all. One
court claimed, for example, albeit with considerable sophistry, that it was
merely construing the procedural terms of Clayton Act Section 11 as incor-
porating by reference the substantive terms of FTC Act Section 9. 15 Thus
the question at issue here was not always directly addressed. It was, however,
considered somewhat more clearly in the merger cases discussed in the follow-
ing section.
5. Merger Divestiture
Although it is Grand Union which is usually cited for the proposition that
the FTC's powers are presumptively not limited by the specific terms in the
Clayton Act, this point was established earlier, and by a higher court, in a less
well-known line of- cases dating back to the 1920's. These are the decisions
considering the Commission's power to order divestiture of assets that had
been acquired in violation of Section 7.
A brief' historical interpolation is needed to put these cases in perspec-
tive. For many years the Clayton Act did not, reach, as it now does, the acquisi-
tion of assets. Section 7 instead barred only the aquisition of "the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation...." Sec-
tion 11 was similarly limited, authorizing the Commission only to order an
offending company to "divest itself of the stock held. -
 These limitations
created the expected problems of enforcement.. A company could entirely es-
cape the restrictions of the Clayton Act by the simple expedient of buying a
competitor's assets. It could also escape the Act, even if it had bought the
forbidden stock, by' using its voting control over the acquired company to
transfer that company's assets to itself. Thereafter any Commission order to
the company to divest. itself of the stock would be a meaningless gesture.
In 1926 the Commission brought the Western. Meat case against a com-
pany' that had executed this last technique.'" Attempting to break out of the
procedural constraints in which it found itself, the Commission added to its order a
requirement that the assets themselVes be divested. This it did on the theory that. the
assets were a fruit of the illegal stock acquisition. The Supreme Court reluctantly
reversed, noting that the Commission's action was based solely on Section 7 and thus
Commission had brought its original action under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
court intimated that both the divestiture order and the penalty could have been based
on the FTC Act, provided only that the Commission was consistent in its choice of
statute. See 540 F.2(1 at 138. This same degree of inconsistency was not present in the
subpoena cases, however, since the Commission did not have a choice of procedures.
'"4
	Casenote, 61 CoLum. L. REV. 291, 294 (1961).
"5
 FTC v. Menzies, 145 F. Supp. at 169 (1956).
"I' FTC v. Western Meal. Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
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could not escape the Clayton Act's limitation of its remedial powers to stock
divestiture. The Court strongly hinted that an action could have been brought.
under Section 5, however, using the less restricted remedial provisions of the FTC
Act."'
The Commission accepted the obvious invitation and returned the follow-
ing year in FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co. " 8 with a divestiture order based on
Section 5. l" Surprisingly enough, the Supreme Court retreated from its
previous position and Found this order improper as well. It is difficult to tell
why this happened. The judicial language focused at times on the scope of
Section 5, and at other times on the intent. of the Clayton Act. ' 7 ° On bal-
ance, however, it appears that the problem did not lie in any general belief
that the limitations set out in the Clayton Act remedies must also be read into
the remedial provisions of the FTC Act. Rather, the problem seems to have
arisen from the belief that there were no divestiture powers contained in the
FTC Act at all, irrespective of what the Clayton Act provided."' Only after
reaching this primary conclusion did the Court. consider the Clayton Act, and
thereupon reaffirmed its earlier holding that it too contained no provisions
authorizing the divestiture of assets.'"
Kodak was a limited case, in other words, construing the letter of Section
5 on a particular issue rather than announcing general principles of Section 5
jurisprudence. 173 And, as so limited, the case has since been "repudiated" by
1 i 7 The Court stated:
Section 5 of the Act ... declares unfair methods of competition in com-
merce unlawful, prescribes the procedure 10 be followed, and gives the
Commission power to require an offending party to cease and desist from
such methods. This section is not presently important; the challenged or-
ders sought to enforce obedience to § 7 of the Clayton Act.
Id. at 557.
'"" 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
11 ' •  Id. at 623.
"" See id. at 623-24.
' 7 ' Id. at 623. See Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 280 F. 45, 48 (8th Cir.
1922); National Harness v. FTC, 268 F. 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1920).
172 274 U.S. at 624 (citing Western Meat as controlling).
17" This was the construction that the Supreme Court itself put on Kodak many
years later. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the
following footnote appears:
Actually, the holdings in the three cases that reached this Court,
Thatcher, Swift, and Arrow-Hart [the first two being companion cases of
Western Meat], were quite narrow.* * * They were based not on a lack of
substantive power under § 7, but on the enforcement section, 11, which
limited the FTC's remedial powers to an order requiring such person to
... divest itself of the stock held ...
The question of the FTC's remedial powers under § I I of the Clayton
Act is to be distinguished from that of its remedial powers under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act .... In Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman
Kodak Co. . . . the Court, relying on Thatcher and Swift, held that the Com-
mission had no power to order divestiture in § 5 proceedings. But cf. Gil-
bertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 129-131; Pan American
World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312, and n.17.
374 U.S. at 339-40 n. 17. Cf. Note, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 594-96 (1926).
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the Supreme Court; 174
 Section 5 is now construed as including divestiture
powers. Thus the suggestion put forward in Western Meat retains its viability.
The remedial powers of the Commission under Section 5 are presumptively
not limited by the existence of narrower provisions on the same subject con-
tained in the Clayton Act. Moreover, by logical extension, the substantive
powers of the Commission under Section 5 should likewise not be limited by
the existence of narrower provisions in the Clayton Act. This latter point was
addressed in the cases arising under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, to which we
now turn.
6. Section 3 and the Requirement for a "Substantial Lessening
of Competition"
The three lines of cases discussed above have offered some useful in-
sights into the proper standard of statutory construction, and have generally
tended to confirm that the Clayton Act. does not exhaust the legislative intent
in the areas that it addresses. All three lines of cases, however, dealt with
collateral matters. This may be seen by analyzing them in a somewhat stylized
way. The Grand Union line can be said to have removed a jurisdictional im-
pediment from the Clayton Act, the subpoena line a procedural impediment,
and the merger line a remedial impediment. The question of substantive law
still remained unanswered. It was still unclear whether Section 5 could, by
invoking the spirit of the law, extend the Clayton Act to new substantive con-
•duct that was analogous to, but outside of, the letter of that statute. This
question was to be answered in the context of Section 3, the Clayton Act
prohibition against exclusive-dealing contracts. Section 3 forbids sales con-
tracts made on the condition that the buyer "shall not use or deal in the goods
... of a competitor or competitors of the ... seller."'" Section 3 applies,
however, only where the effect of such a contractual term "may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce."'"
The relationship between this provision and Section 5 was first consi-
dered in two early Supreme Court. cases. 177 In each, the Commission
brought actions under both Section 3 and Section 5. In each instance the
Commission was reversed. 178
 Although these cases might be decided differ-
ently today, however, they were grounded upon relatively narrow factual de-
terminations and thus did not hold generally against actions based on the
spirit of the Clayton Act. In the first of these cases, FTC v. Curtis Publishing
Co., ' 7 " the Commission challenged the use of exclusive agents in magazine
174
 FTC v. Dean Foods Co.. 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.4 (1966) (Kodak "has been
repudiated").
175
 15	 § 14 (1976).
1711 Id.
177
 FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co.. 260 U.S. 568 (1923); ETC v. Sinclair Oil Co..
261 U.S. 463 (1923).
' 7 ' 260 U.S, at 582 (cease and desist order "clearly wrong"): 261 U.S. at 476
(circuit courts' decisions setting aside cease and desist (orders affirmed).
17"
 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
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distribution. The Supreme Court approved the practice, noting that it in-
volved a bona fide agency relationship rather than a sale, thus placing it out-
side of Section 3."" The Court further noted that the practice as actually
used was fair and reasonable, thus sheltering it from condemnation under
Section 5. I"
 The second case, FTC v. Sinclair Oil Co., 1 B 2
 involved an oil com-
pany's practice of leasing gasoline pumps to service stations at a nominal
charge, on condition that only the company's products be dispensed from
those pumps. The Court held that this arrangement was permissible under
Section 3 because the service stations remained legally free to sell other
brands of gasoline from other pumps.'" The arrangement was similarly
found permissible under Section 5 because, in the Court's opinion, it would
not create undue market foreclosure as a practical matter."'
The most interesting thing about these cases lay in what the Supreme
Court did not do. It did not. confine its analysis to Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, dismissing the Section 5 count as an impermissible attempt to extend the
former statute beyond its terms. Rather, in each instance the Court consid-
ered the Section 5 count on its own merits. I"
 Thus from the very beginning
of the FTC Act the Court was open to cases challenging conduct that was
analogous to Clayton Act violations, even in the absence of any affirmative
indication that the legislature desired such extensions.
The Supreme Court's long-standing promise came to fruition in the 1966
case of FTC v. Brown Shoe Co."" This is the same Brown Shoe decision that was
discussed in an earlier section, involving a program of designated exclusive-
dealing outlets. The Court conceded that too few dealers were involved in the
program to threaten, at that time, a substantial lessening of competition, and
thus no challenge could be brought under the letter of Section 3. The Court
nonetheless struck the program down, as we have seen, on the theory that it
constituted an incipient violation of the Clayton Act.'" There the matter
might have rested. In Fact, however, the Court went further. It announced an
alternative basis For its decision. The Court found that the practice was also
illegal because it constituted a present violation of the spirit or Clayton Act.:
[Tillie Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices un-
fair. This broad power of the Commission is particularly well estab-
lished with regard to trade practices which conflict. with the basic
policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices
may not actually violate those laws .... This program obviously con-
flicts with the central policy of both I of the Sherman Act and § 3
"" Id. at 581.
' 8 ' Id. at 581 - 82.
'' 26] U.S. 463 (1923),
Id. at 473.
181 Id. at 475-76.
'" Id.: 260 U.S. at 579-81.
''" 384 U.S. 316 (1066).
• '" 384 U.S. at 321- 9 2. See text at notes 92-94 supra.
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of the Clayton Act against contracts which take away freedom of
purchasers to buy in an open market.'""
It will be observed that the Brown Shoe decision meets many of the
criteria for which we have been searching. It involves substantive conduct
rather than collateral issues of jurisdiction and procedure. Moreover, it in-
volves, unlike Grand Union, a fact pattern as to which the legislative intent was
ambiguous. The legislature may have wished to permit (though not to re-
quire) the condemnation of all exclusive-dealing contracts, on the theory that
they have few countervailing benefits for society. With equal plausibility, how-
ever, the legislature may have wished to permit condemnation of only those
that threaten a substantial lessening of competition, on the theory that indi-
viduals should otherwise he free to regulate their affairs as they please. There
is no way of telling the true legislative intent from the face of the statute, and
the Court did not. think it necessary to delve into the legislative history. It
simply affirmed on the basis of a general analogy to the statute. By so doing,
the Court also affirmed the principle that, in ambiguous cases, the Commis-
sion is free to extend the substantive provisions of the Clayton Act by means
of Section 5 actions based upon its spirit. ' 8 "
The principle enunciated in Brown Shoe has recently received some indi-
rect but. powerful support. For some years the Commission has taken the posi-
tion that Section 5 may be used to extend Section 7 of the Clayton Act to
cover the acquisition of partnerships, as well as of the "corporations" that are
specifically covered by that statute.'" The Commission has made this exten-
sion only in its own decisions,'• which have evidently not been subjected to
judicial review. The Supreme Court, however, in an apparently gratuitous
footnote, has strongly hinted that the extension was proper:
1" 384 U.S. at 320-21 (footnotes omitted). Thai this is a full-fledged alternative
ground is not. entirely beyond dispute. It might be argued that it is dictum, since the
final sentence of the opinion was cast in incipiency terms alone: "l\fle hold that. the
Commission acted well within its authority in declaring the Brown Shoe franchise pro-
gram unfair whether it was completely full blown or not." Id. at 322. The two concepts
are treated in the body of the opinion on such equal (if undifferentiated) terms, how-
ever, that the better reading seems to be that of alternative theories.
' 8" Brown Shoe has since been billowed in LG. BalfOur Co. v. VIC, 442 F.2d 1, 19-21
(7th Cir. 1971) (exclusive-dealing contracts). See also l.aPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 120 (5th
Cir. 1966). LaPeyre involved discrimination in lease charges, rather than in the "prices"
expressly covered by the Clayton Act. The Fifth Circuit, however, although upholding the
charges against the respondent, did not rest its decision explicitly on the policy of the Clayton
Act. This omission may only reflect the fact that the case was begun, and its pleadings framed,
before Brown Shoe had been decided.
19" See 15 U.S.C.	 18 (1976).
' 8 ' See Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 724-27 (1965), modified  by consent,
1967 Trade Cases 11 72,124 (9th Cir. 1967) ("Applying Section 5 to non-corporate
acquisitions effectuates, rather than circumvents or conflicts with, Congress' policy with
respect to the prevention of anticompetitive acquisitions"). Commission decisions have
utilized Section 5 in order to enforce the spirit of Section 7 in a number of other
respects as well. See Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1288-92 (1966), modified by con-
sent, 1967 CCH Trade Cases 11 72,086 (7th Cir. 1976) (acquired firm held liable);
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It is, of course, well established that the Commission has broad
power to apply § 5 to reach transactions which violate the standards
of the Clayton Act, although technically not subject to the Act's pro-
hibitions .... We have no occasion in the case now before us to
decide whether application of .§ 5 to assets acquisition by or from
noncorporate business entities constitutes an appropriate exercise of
the power ... . 1112
Since nothing in Section 7 affirmatively indicates a desire to reach partner-
ships, this dictum again suggests a Presumption. in favor of Commission dis-
cretion,'"
V. CONDUCT VIOLATING RECOGNIZED
STANDARDS OF FAIR BUSINESS BEHAVIOR
The authority discussed in the previous sections does not exhaust the
Commission's powers. The legal theories discussed above are all means by
which the Commission can enforce more or less clearly expressed legislative
antitrust policies. The Commission was intended to have a broader jurisdic-
tion than that, however. Congress intended that it should also exercise a gen-
eral mandate to articulate and enforce recognized standards of fair business
conduct. Senator Saulbury, a member of the Conference Committee, put the
point in the following way:
Courts have always recognized the customs of merchants, and it is
my impression that under this act the commission and the courts will
be called upon to consider and recognize the fair and unfair customs
of merchants, manufacturers, and traders, and probably prohibit
many practices and methods which have not heretofore been clearly
recognized as unlawful.'"
Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962) (acquisition of firms not engaged in in-
terstate commerce); id. at 1091-92 (series of acquisitions, no one of which might violate
Section 7) (dictum); Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. at 727, 731 (same) (dictum). Not-
withstanding these relatively numerous cases, however, no reviewing court has yet held
that Section 5 will reach any merger, let alone a merger that is outside the letter of
Section 7. See note 61 supra.
"2
 United Slates v. American Building Maintenance industries, 422 U.S. 271,
279 n.7 (1975) (citations omitted).
"3
 The rule of construction suggested in this section is generally similar to the
one proposed in Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 qf the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 821, 844 n.68 (1961).
Oppenheim proposes that Section 5 be used to supplement the Clayton Act "only ...
to reach transactions and practices economically equivalent to those particularized by the
Clayton Act. but not within its coverage because of a jurisdictional deficiency." Id. (em-
phasis in original). This test would appear to take the Grand Union case as its
paradigm, and would appear somewhat narrower than the formula proposed in this
paper. It should be noted, however, that the intervening case law, and the Brown Shoe
decision in particular, has to some extent undercut Oppenheim's restrictive proviso.
" 4 See 51 CONG. REC. 12981 (remarks of Senator Sutherland, quoting Senator
Saulsbury), For similar references to trade customs see id. at 8979 (remarks of Con-
gressman Murdock); id. at 13048 (remarks of Senator Cummins).
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Senator Newlands expressed the same point in still more general language.
He stated that. unfair competition "covers every practice and method between
competitors upon the part of one against the other that is against public mor-
als, in my judgment, or is an offense for which a remedy lies either at law or
in equity "':'a In short, therefore, the Commission was to enforce public pol-
icy as well as legislative policy.
This role of the Commission was recognized in FTC v. Gratz,'"" the first
case to reach the Supreme Court under Section 5. The Gratz decision is usu-
ally cited as an example of narrow and unsympathetic Supreme Court review,
and, in fact, the Commission's determination was reversed in that case. The
Court's decision seems best understood, however, as only a reflection of the
Court's then-current. practice of independently reviewing the Commission's
factual conclusions. The legal holding of the case actually was quite generous
in its negative implication. The . Court found that the words "unfair methods of
competition" were "clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as
opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud
or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency
unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly." '"' Front this it appears
that conduct opposed to good morals in the enumerated ways could constitute
a violation of Section 5.'"
Some years later the Court moved from negative implication to postitive
holding. In FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.,"" the Court considered the pro-
priety of a plan for marketing children's penny candy. Under the plan a cer-
tain percentage of the candies were packaged with a penny inside the wrap-
per. Buyers who happened to pick those pieces thus received their purchase
for Free. The elements of chalice in this plan proved irresistible to children,
and keppel accordingly expanded its market share at the expense of com-
petitors who did not. adopt the same technique.'" The Court condemned
the marketing scheme as an unfair method of competition. It held that the
'"' 51 CoNc. REC. I 1- 1 1 2 ( 19 1 4 ). For a more complete discussion of this concept
see 51 CONC. REC. 12980 (11114) (remarks of Senator Newlands) ("I think there are
certain practices that shock the universal conscience ()I' mankind, and the general
.judgment upon the facts themselves would be that such practices are unfair . ').
1 "" 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
'° Id. at 427.
"m The Supreme Court subsequently observed that the G ratz decision was
broader than it has sometimes been interpreted.. Cee FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233, 242 (1972) (it "would grant the FTC greater power ... than the panel of
the Court of Appeals acknowledges").
1 "" 21/1 U.S. 304 (1934).
"" Id. at 312-13. Thus Keppers conduct was shown to be a "method of compe-
tition. - GJ. EH.: v. Raladam Co.. 383 U.S. 643 (1931) (Section 5 applies only where
compeinors are affected). The Court treated the harm to competition as only a
threshold jurisdictional issue, however, rather than as a consideration on the merits,
since it proceeded to find the conduct "unfair - on the basis of moral and legislative-
policy determinations. 291 U.S. at 310-12.
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gambling features of the plan were contrary to public policy, and that the
Commission was empowered to halt the scheme under Section 5. 20 '
Some general principles can he established when Gratz and Keppel are
considered together. The Commission appears to be empowered 10 enforce
two separate types of public policies. First, it can prevent violation of generally
recognized business ethics. Second, it can prevent violation of general substan-
tive statutes in cases where the violation has conferred a cost advantage. The
clearest teaching of the two cases concerns the Commission's power to enforce
recognized business ethics. The word "recognized" is used advisedly. Both de-
cisions took some pains to note that the applicable moral standards would
have originated outside of the Commission itself. Gratz referred to practices
"heretofore regarded" as improper, 202 while Keppel referred to a public policy
against gambling that was defined by "the common law and criminal stat-
utes." 2° Such sources are the most suitable foundation for a Section 5 ac-
tion. 2 " 4 is not to say that the Commission has no power to define public
policies on its own initiative. As will be seen in the following section, it has
that power as well. Since the limits on that power are not yet precisely de-
fined, however, its exercise will be subject. to close judicial review. Whenever
possible, therefore, a public-policy action is best founded on the basis of some
external authority.
The second teaching of the cases opens an entirely different vista. It.
appears that the Commission is empowered to prevent the violation of any
substantive statute—not merely the violation of an antitrust. law—in cases
where the violation gives a competitive advantage to the firm committing it.
This principle is derived from Keppel, where the respondent gained a market-
ing advantage by breaking the criminal laws relating to gambling. 205 The
Court held the practice to be a form of unfair competition. 2011 The principle,
"t 291 U.S. at 313. The Court observed:
Without inquiring whether, as respondent contends, the criminal statutes
imposing penalties on gambling. lotteries and the like, fail to reach this
particular practice in most or any of the states. it is clear that the practice is
of the sort which the common law and criminal statutes have long deemed
contrary to public policy .... It would seem a gross perversion of the
nornial meaning of the word ... to hold that the method is not 'unfair'.
2"2 953 U.S. at 427.
213 291 U.S. at 313.
2114 It may also be possible to define public policies by direct reference to the
Constitution. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1976). There it.
was held an "unfair practice" to bring collection suits in an inconvenient forum, on a
theory that this was analogous to a violation of the due-process clause. The decision is
discussed in a Note, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1416 (1977). This approach may be of value
primarily in consumer-protection cases, due to the Constitution's emphasis on the
rights of individual persons, On at least some occasions, however, the approach may he
valuable to the competition case as well. For example, the desire for diverse sources of
information which underlies the First Amendment might he a relevant consideration
when a merger between two communications firms is judged under Section 5.
2115 291 U.S. at 313.
2111 1d
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however, is broader than the facts of that. case. Most regulatory statutes in-
volve substantial compliance costs to the subject. firm. Labor laws, EPA regula-
tions, and OSHA rules come to mind by way of examples. A firm which pur-
posely violates any of these rules can realize significant cost savings, and those
savings can translate into a competitive advantage over companies that have
cc nn plied with the relevant law. The violations might therefbre be reached
through a Section 5 action to enforce the public policy declared in the stat-
utes, and to end the unfairness inherent. in it calculated breach of thein. 2 " 7
There would, of course, be serious questions of primary jurisdiction in
many such actions, as well as questions of interagency comity. But, assuming
that these questions can be resolved in a particular case, the bare existence of
the necessary' enforcement powers under Section 5 would seem to follow as a
reasonable reading of Keppel. In some ways an action along these lines actually
would be on stronger ground than Keppel itself. In that case the Court as-
sumed, for purposes of its decision, that the respondent's conduct might not
have constituted a literal violation of the law.
in short, the Commission seems to be empowered to determine and en-
force recognized standards of fair competitive behavior, whether these have
been declared by statute sir have emerged as the generally accepted ethical
71111S of the community. This is primarily true (and perhaps exclusively true)
where violation of those standards confers a competitive advantage. To this,
however, one qualification must be added. The public policy On which the
Commission acts cannot be too broad, no matter how firmly established it. may
be. Some of the truly fundamental policies of the country—such as those
involved in supporting small business or in ending racial discrimination in
employment—are too important and all-pervasive to be stated in terms of
monolithic principles. They contain qualifications, limitations, and countervail-
ing considerations, and are frequently in a stale of flux. If the Commission
there to resort. to such policies as these to define a standard of fair conduct.
therefore, it necessarily would have to engage in a balancing of their con-
stituent elements. To the extent. that the outcome of this balancing is not
clearly prescribed by congressional intentions, judicial precedent, or similar
factors, a court would be most. reluctant to uphold such a degree of discretion
" 7
	Supreme Court has intimated that such an action would be proper. In
FTC v. Sperry & fluiclan,vm the Court cited, with apparent approval, a Commission
memorandum in which one criterion of unfairness was identified as "whether the
practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, ()fiends pub-
lic policy as it has been established by statutes ... See 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1971).
This passage is reproduced in full at note 245 infra. At least one state court has
adopted this theory in a case based on a "little FTC Act. - So' Health Care Services,
Florida, Inc. v. Shevin, 311 So.2d 761) (3d Dist. Ct, App. Ha. 1975), cert. denied, 334
So.2d (308 (S.Ct. Ha. 1976). There it was held an unfair practice to market a weight-
control drug for which the required FDA approval had not been obtained. Another
stale has reached a similar result legislatively. A section of Louisiana's little FTC Act
makes it an unfair act to commit "any violation of ally prohibitory law of this state.''
See Lawyer's Realty Corp. v. Peninsular Title his. Co., 428 F. Stipp. 1288. 1'292 (F.D.
La. 1977) (construing I.A. Rev. STAT. § 22:1214 (West)). It does not Follow, or course,
that legislation was required in order to attain this goal. See also Rogers v. FTC, 492 F.
2d 228, 232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Simeon Management Corp.,
87 F.T.C. 1184, 1231 (1976).
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in a matter of such great public importance. What emerges then, is the follow-
ing qualifying principle: The Commission's ability to enforce an established
public policy is limited by the ambiguity of that. policy. To the extent. the
policy is ambiguous in terms of the conduct that it demands, it is less amena-
ble to characterization, for the purpose of stating positive law under Section 5,
as an "established -
 public policy.
VI. CONDUCT VIOLATING COMPETITION POLICY AS
FRAMED 8111.1E COMMISSION
Some of the limitations discussed in the previous section may be dis-
pensed with here. The Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson
Co. 2" seems to endow the Commission with power—within parameters that
are not yet fully defined—to formulate and enforce competition policy on its
own initiative. The Court stated:
[L]egislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the Fed-
eral Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if,
in measuring.a practice against the elusive, but congressionally man-
dated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public
values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed
in the spirit of the antitrust laws. z"`•'
In this passage the Court declared that the Commission could pursue "public
values-
 not contained in the letter or spirit of the antitrust. laws. Since the
Court did not explicitly define or limit the values that might be used, it might
seem at first that this power is essentially boundless. From a rereading of the
case, however, and from a review of the pertinent legislative history, it would
appear that a workably precise definition is in fact attainable. The "public
values" will be limited primarily to those that make up the congressional com-
petition policy. That is to say, the Commission may seek to enjoin conduct
only if it has a significant adverse effect on competition, and only if those
effects are not outweighed by other consumer benefits or by bona fide business
justifications. But if those limitations are satisfied—and judicial review should
ensure that they are—then the Commission should be able to reach any con-
duct that significantly threatens competition, even if' such conduct neither vio-
lates the letter or spirit. of the antitrust, laws, nor constitutes an incipient viola-
tion of them.
Discussion of this authority will be divided into three parts. The first part
will review the relevant legislative history. The second will review the Spero, &
Hutchinson decision, which is the most. recent and important. Supreme Court
pronouncement. on the subject. And finally, the third part will explore the
probable boundaries and limitations on this cause of action.
2 " 405 U.S. 233 (l972).
2" Id. at 244. Although this language is quite broad, it probably would not be
justifiable to extend it. still further, as some have proposed, by emphasizing the com-
parison to a 'court of equity'. This reference Was presumably only meant to suggest the
variety of non-statutory factors the Commission could include in a legal analysis,
rather than to imply that the agency possessed substantive discretion to the same de-
gree as an equity court.
276	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:227
A. The Legislative History
References to the legislative history are particularly important in inter-
preting this aspect of Section 5. Unlike the theories of Section 5 that were
discussed previously, this one has not yet been the subject of many court deci-
sions. 2 " The intentions of the legislature therefore must be deduced almost
wholly from the language of the floor debates, rather than with the assistance
and cross-checking that can be provided by subsequent judicial constructions.
This method of inquiry will give rise to some special hazards. The floor de-
bates on Section 5 contain, not a shortage of information, but rather an em-
barrassing excess of it. The Senate debates alone lasted nearly six weeks and
filled perhaps a thousand pages of the Congressional Record. During this ex-
tended discussion nearly every point of view was expressed, and nearly every
possible construction was put on Section 5. Quotations from the debates must
therefore be read with a certain amount of skepticism; much will depend on
the identity and the motivations of the congressman being quoted. Some legis-
lators were not particularly familiar with the bill, and others made implausible
predictions about the effects of certain provisions in order to dissuade their
colleagues from voting for them. As a result, courts have occasionally
cautioned against excessive reliance on the debates when construing Section 5.
This difficulty, although real, can be minimized by an appropriate selec-
tion of the remarks to he relied upon. The views of four people would appear
to be particularly persuasive. On the Senate side they were Senator Newlands,
the author of the FTC Act in general, and Senator Cummins, the author of
the original committee study and of Section 5 in its final version. 2" Of these
two men Senator Newlands was generally considered to be the more au-
thoritative spokesman. 212
 The two senators did not always agree, 21 ' but
when they did they could usually persuade the Senate to accept their ideas on
the bill.'" On the House side the principal figures were Congressman
Covington, who first, introduced the FTC Act in that body, and Congressman
Stevens, who first proposed the addition of language prohibiting un fair com-
petition. 215
 Of these two persons Congressman Covington was regarded as
the principal spokesman.'"
The speeches of these and other legislators make it reasonably clear that.
the Commission, under Section 5, can go beyond established public policies
and can Frame competition policies on its own initiative. This conclusion was
not neatly reached on the final day of the debates. Rather, it is a concept that
21 " One author states that, during the period between Brown Shoe atid Sperry &
Hutchinson, the Commission brought no Section 5 actions without analogizing them in
some way to violations of other antitrust laws. Comment. The Attack On Trading Stamps,
57 Gro. 1..j. 1082, 1090-91 n.38 (1969).
211 Sce note 295 infra.
212
 51 CoNG. REc. 11103, 11106 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
21 " See, e.g., id. at 11535.
214 See, e.g., id. at 13315 - 18.
215
 Mr. Rublee and Mr. Brandeis, who were among the original proponents of
this idea, were working with Congressman Stevens. Id. at 11537 (remarks of Senator
Newlands).
21 " See id. •at 14939 (remarks of Congressman Stevens).
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is threaded through the entire length of the discussion, recurring at intervals.
The development of the concept will therefore be recounted in a non-
chronological manner, beginning with the more basic perceptions of the
Commission's authority and building from those to the more complex formu-
lations.
The most basic perception of Section 5's public-policy powers is easily
stated. The section was regarded by friend and foe alike as vesting the Com-
mission with a largely novel degree of authority. 2 " Senator Borah, no
friend of the measure, saw no "possible industrial condition [that] would .
not be within the power of the commission to examine.” 2 " Senator Reed,
another opponent of Section 5, observed that this law was different from
other general prohibitions in that it conveyed no sense of what particular
conduct would be included within it:
Fraud has been defined; false pretenses have been defined; tricks
and devices have been defined by a general rule, both in the statute
law and in the decisions of the courts. Of course, we have not under-
taken in any law to specify all of the things which may constitute a
fraud. You have, however, laid down well-known rules as to what.
constitutes fraud.
This bill leaves us as much in the dark as would a bill declaring
that "whoever shall do anything which is wrong shall be
pun ished ." 21 "
The proponents of Section 5, while not conceding that the bill would allow
the Commission to exercise arbitrary powers, did agree that. it would let the
agency go beyond previous court decisions and the common-law concepts of
unfair competition. 22"
The advocates of Section 5 expected that it would reach not only beyond
the existing common law, but also beyond the existing standards of business
ethics whenever necessary to put a stop to anticompetitive behavior. It was for
this reason that Senator Cummins opposed the addition of criminal sane-
217
 The Interstate Commerce Commission Act. which gave that. agency the
power to determine "reasonable-
 rates, was frequently cited as some precedent for-
Section 5. See, e.g., id. at 11104 (remarks of Senator Cummins). That act applied only
to a single segment of the economy, however, rather than to business in general.
2 ' 8 Id. at 11103. Senator Borah later stated that this power was unduly broad
and would prove to he burdensome and chilling. N. at 11188,
21 " Id. at 11116.
2211 This is illustrated by the following colloquy:
SENATOR SUTHERLAND. 1 should like to ask ... where would the
trade commission go in order to find out what was meant by 'unfair com-
petition'? Would they go to the decisions of the courts and to the common
law?
SENATOR CUMMINS. Partly.
Id. at 11105. This same point was later taken up in another exchange:
SENATOR POMERENE. Has not the Senator from Iowa [Mr.
Cummins}, as well as the other Senators, been contending that the
words 'unfair competition' embrace many practices which might not.
heretofore have been declared to have been unfair competition?
SENATOR CUMMINS. Unquestionably.
278	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 Vol. 21:227
tions. 221
 He concluded that it would be improper to impose criminal liability
where the general language of the statute did not afford adequate notice that.
a particular action, considered proper in the past, would be found unlawful
by the Commission. 222 A similar view of the Commission's authority may be
inferred from some remarks of Senator Newlands, in which he indicated that
the Commission would have discretion to turn down a case that involved only
borderline ethical considerations:223 It will be observed that if the Commis-
sion is able to decline a case involving borderline ethical considerations, it also
hi. at 11105 (1914). Senator Newlands similarly noted that the phrase included "those
things which the courts of this country have declared to he illegal, - to which Senator
Reed replied: "We do not care to reach the things the law already condemns and that.
the courts already prohibit and punish .... What we want to reach is that realm which
at present may he entered upon by the unjust man. - Id. at 12028. But see id. at 11115
(remarks of Senator Ponterene, a member of the Conference Committee) ("Of course,
this commission could riot declare a thing to he unfair competition which was not
unfair competition under the well-defined principles of the law''). This remark oc-
curred relatively early in the debates, however, and so it may not reflect the Senator's
final views on the subject.
VII Senator Cummins stated:
I would not give immunity to any man. 1 shrink front any sort of
immunity. When one has violated the law—consciously violated the
law—he should pay the penalty for his wrongdoing. Rut when it becomes
necessary in order to preserve competition that we shall prohibit acts which
have heretofore been regarded as moral, which have heretofore prevailed
in every industrial society in the world, I ant unwilling that the failure to
obey these regulations, which must necessarily be somewhat uncertain and
vague, shall make the men who conduct our business affairs criminals,
without consciousness of intiml turpitude or moral dereliction.
Id. at 11539. Senator Newlands was likewise opposed to the inclusion of the "extreme
penalties" in the FTC Act, on the grounds that rights and duties under that legislation
would remain uncertain for sortie time. See id. at 11111 - 12.
222 The context of these remarks is not entirely clear. On previous pages of the
Congressional Record Senator Cummins had keen advocating amendments it) the F1'C
Act that would have forbidden interlocking directorates, stock acquisitions, and other
matters that were eventually incorporated into the Clayton Act instead. His remarks
may therefore be relevant only to the Clayton Act. On the other hand, however, the
quoted passage is the conclusion for a more wide-ranging speech on the FIT. Act in
general. That speech began, as it apparently ended, by considering whether the Com-
mission could grant immunity from Sherman Act prosecutions by its decisions under
Section 5. See id. at 11528. The best interpretation therefore seems to be that this
passage refers to the FTC Act generally, and not just to the unsuccessful amendments.
223 He began by stating that any businessman who felt himself unfairly injured
could apply to the Commission for relief. The following exchange then ensued:
SENATOR NEWLANDS. It would then be in its [the Commission's] discre-
tion as to whether it would grant a hearing. I would not expect it to take
hold of every trivial matter.
SENATOR McCUMBER. Would the Senator regard a matter of this kind
[referring to a hypothetical that he had just posed] as trivial?
SENATOR NEWLANDS ... When I say 'trivial' 1 do not mean in the
amount involved but I mean trivial in the sense that it is so near the divid-
ing line between good and bad morals that people would differ with refer-
ence to it.
Id. at 11109.
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is able, in its discretion, to select such it case for hearing. This in turn implies
that the Commission is authorized to decide a case based on principles of
conduct that have not yet won universal acceptance in the business commu-
nity.
Given that. Section 5 can reach anticompetitive behavior not proscribed
by existing common law or business ethics, it remains to be determined just
how far the statute will reach. The answer, it appears, is that Section 5 will
cover any form of conduct that is significantly detrimental to competition.
Senator Cummins suggested as much in the following remarks:
We are here endeavoring to sustain competition; that is the primary
purpose of the antitrust law [i.e., the Sherman Act]; it is the chief
object of all these laws that we are now proposing;
We have chosen to report a rule for the trade commission in the
language which has been suggested, namely, 'unfair competition. It
is that competition which is resorted to for the purpose of destroying
competition, of eliminating a competitor, and of introducing
monopoly. That is the 'unfair competition,' in its broad sense, which
this bill endeavors to prevent . The unfairness must be tinctured
with unfairness to the public, not merely with unfairness to the rival
or competitor.... We are not simply trying to protect one man
against another; we are trying to protect the people of the United
States, and of course, there must be in the imposture or in the vi-
cious practice or method something that has a tendency to affect the
people of the country or he injurious to their welfare. 224
The language of the statute was therefore made deliberately broad to provide,
in all instances, for adequate protection against harms to competition. 225
An actionable harm to competition need not be calculated or deliberate.
Section 5 can evidently reach such harms regardless of how they come about.
Senator Cummins was clearly of this view. At one point in the debates a col-
league proposed to replace the general language of Section 5 with a more
specific listing of unfair practices. In speaking against this proposal the
Senator said:
All these devices and acts [specified in the amendment] must be
done or used with the intent or with the effect of destroying or un-
reasonably hindering the business of another, or of preventing
another from engaging in business. That is to say, before the Gov-
ernment can enforce this section, if the amendment now proposed is
made a part of it, it must prove that these things were done with the
intent upon the part of the person who performs or does them to
224 M. at 11104-05.
22 r, Senator Hollis had a generally similar understanding of the bill:
Fair competition is competition which is successful through superior effi-
ciency. Competition is unfair when it resorts to methods which shut out
competitors who, by reason of their efficiency, might otherwise be able to
continue in business and prosper.
Id. at 12146.
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destroy or unreasonably hinder the business of another. It omits the
great public interest. There can be unfair competition in which the
public is interested without any intent as described in the amend-
ment. 22"
Thus Section 5 permits the Commission to act against. any form of conduct.
detrimental to competition regardless of the presence or absence of specific
intent..
Some may still doubt that the Commission possesses a general power to
enjoin anticompetitive conduct, notwithstanding the support for this interpre-
tation in the debates, since it appears to be broader and more general than
formulations traditionally given by the courts. In fact, however, Congress was
virtually unanimous in this understanding of the matter. Even the stningest
opponents of Section 5 were more concerned with its uncertainty than with its
scope. Many of them were willing to accept alternative language that would
have been somewhat more precise but little narrower. 227 Senator Reed,
perhaps the leading opponent of Section 5, endorsed such limiting proposals
and stated that if something to this effect. Were substituted for the existing
language of the bill it would cure his constitutional doubts about it. 228 A few
days later he formally proposed an amendment along similar lines. "Ihe
amendment provided that:
The term 'unfair competition' shall embrace all those acts, devices.
concealments, threats, coerciorts, deceits, frauds, discriminations, dis-
honest practices, false representations, slanders of business, and all
other acts or devices, whether of like nature with those herein
enumerated or not, done or used with the intent or the effect. of
221' Id. at 13311. The proposed amendment was eventually rejected. See id. at
13314. This reading is also suggested by a colloquy that took place on the House side
of Congress. There two members were discussing "fraud on the public, - a broad con-
cept that they seemed to regard as synonymous with "unfair methods of competition
MR. MONTAGUE. 1 would ask the gentleman it this distinction is not
clear: There may be fraud where there is fraudulent intent, in the first
place. Secondly, there may be a fraud where the result is so injurious,
whether intent exists or not, as to imply fraud?
MR. STEVENS. I think in those classes of cases wherever the public in-
terest is injuriously affected the commission has clearly the right to de-
nounce it as a fraud ....
Id. at 14937.
227 Senator Lewis, for example, gave the following interpretation on the floor:
I hold that 'unfair competition' means that course of conduct which un-
dermines a man by misrepresenting him and his methods[l by seeking to
obtain advantages through rebate systemsH through private contracts—
`tying contracts, as they are sometimes called—or by any other form of
competition which places the individual at such a disadvantage that he
cannot obtain equal rights in transportation, equal opportunities in the city
where he lives, equal opportunities for wade and sale, or any other form of
conduct which would be so oppressive and unjust in its application as
would be entitled, under the law of humanity, to be designated unfair.
Id. at 12932-33.
228 Id. at 12933-34.
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which is to destroy or unreasonably hinder the business of another
or prevent another from engaging in business, or to restrain trade or
to create a monopoly. 229
Senator Reed's overall sense of Section 5 thus appears, in short, to have been
not greatly different from Senator Cummins' own interpretation.
This is not to say, of course, that there were no significant differences
between the perceptions of those who supported and those who opposed the
bill. The bilk advocates presumably intended for it to have a greater reach in
some substantive respects than the opponents would have been willing to con-
cede. At one point, fm example, Senator Cummins intimated that Section 5
might allow the Commission to impose a limit on the relative size that a com-
pany could attain. 2 "" It is doubtful, in light of their concerns regarding the
" 9 hi. at 13310. It was against this proposed amendment that Senator Cum-
mins made the remarks quoted above. A general summary of different Senators' defin-
itions of" 'unfair competition' appears at id. at 12980-84 (remarks of Senator Suther-
land). A more thorough compilation of those definitions appears in Montague, Unfair
Methods of Competition, 25 YALE Li 20 (1915).
"" Senator Cummins made this remark during the course of a discussion of
the steel industry. He began by observing that one company—linited States Steel—
controlled half of the capital employed in the industry, while the remaining half was
divided among twenty-five or thirty other corporations. He then made the following
comments:
If I were a czar, if I could make the law, that would never have oc-
curred. 1 do not believe that it is necessary, in order to reach full efficiency
arid employ and utilize all the economies of this age, that there shall
be a billion and a half dollars in the hands of one man or in the hands of
one hoard of directors. I believe that competition in many respects between
this great combination and its lesser rivals is unequal; it is not, so far as I
know, unfair. I think it would be vastly better for this country if', instead of
one corporation having a billion and a half dollars of capital, or one-half of
it, and the remainder distributed among a score or more of corporations,
there should he 5 or 0 or 10 corporations each employing $300,000,000 of
capital.
51 CONC. REC. 11 ,156 (1914). Senator Cummins. it will be observed, expressly noted
that the competitive methods being used were not necessarily unfair. A few moments
later, however, he seemed to indicate that there was an inherent unfairness in the
industrial structure itself':
If I had my way about it—and the Senate would have an opportunity to
vote upon that proposition before the consideration of this bill shall have
been concluded—some function, some tribunal of the Government, would
be given the authority to determine what capital could he employed in any
one business, with this guide, that it should not he so great as in and of
itself to impair or destroy substantially competitive conditions: and until we
do limit the amount of capital that can he associated under one manage-
ment we shall not have arrived at a fair regulation of commerce. It is the
very beginning of any efficient regulation of the power that can be exer-
cised in the association or aggregation of wealth.
Id. Senator Cummins acknowledged that "bigness- per se was not an evil and observed
that an appropriate asset ceiling would differ from industry to industry, so it would
not be practical for Congress to enact the limitations itself. He then proposed a solu-
tion:
I would, however, give that power to it COMMiSSi011. I would give it to the
trade commission—with this rule: That no corporation shall employ an
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propriety of ambiguous legislative language, that the more conservative oppo-
nents of the measure would have been willing to go this far. 231 In any event,
there is considerable support in the legislative debates for the proposition that
the Commission may reach and enjoin any conduct, otherwise within its juris-
diction, that poses a significant. threat. to competition.
There is also support in the congressional debates for the view that the
Commission can act only when there is a threat of such harm to competition.
Thus the Commission may not have the authority to decide a case on the sole
basis of social or political considerations that arc not reasonably central to
Congress' conception of a competitive marketplace.212 Rather, some substan-
tial harm to competition must always be shown.'" Senator Cummins had
expressly noted this, stating that "[t]he only unfair competition that the sec-
extent of capital which in and of itself destroys or substantially int pairs
competitive conditions. * * Undoubtedly it is within the power of Con-
gress [and hence the power may be delegated]. We could say, for example,
that no corporation engaged in the iron or steel business with a capital of
more than $100,000,000 should engage in interstate commerce.
Id. at. 11456 -57 (1914). It is difficult to judge how significant these remarks are. It
seems most probable that they refer, not to Section 5. but rather to an amendment to
the FTC Act, generally similar to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, that Senator Cummins
later proposed. See id. at 12726. in this event the comments would not have any direct
bearing on the scope of Section 5.
Under an alternative interpretation, however, they could bear on Section 5. Two
arguments tend to point in that direction. First, Senator Cummins' version of Section 7
referred only to stock acquisitions, rather than to asset size per se. The amendment
therefore does not jibe precisely with the comments quoted above, and, as a result, the
comments might be held to be directed toward some other portion of the law. That
portion would presumably be Section 5. Second, and 'mire important, the prop onents
of Section 5 believed that the specific prohibitions of the Clayton Act were covered by
Section 5 in any event, Regardless of whether Senator Cummins' comments found
expression in the precise language of the later act, therefore, they would still inform
our understanding of Section 5 as well.
231
 This is not, however, uniformly "true. Senator Sutherland, generally an op-
ponent of Section 5, indicated that he also favored a limitation on corporate assets. Id.
at 12983.
232 it is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper to attempt. a relatively
precise definition of what Congress meant by "competition - in Section 5 and in the
other antitrust laws. It should be noted, however, that a case could be made fin' a
somewhat broader view of the Commission's jurisdiction than that suggested in text.
This would begin with the observation that the ultimate concerns of Congress were not
business and competitive conditions per se. Rather, the concern was for harm to con-
sumers and members of the general public. Ordinarily we seek to indirectly safeguard
the welfare of this group by ensuring that competition is fair and vigorous. In some
respects, however, it may be preferable to address this goal directly. Thus the Commis-
sion might have a general equitable jurisdiction to examine consumer business prac-
tices that harm members of the public, 10 balance that harm against the benefits or
justifications for the practices. and to prohibit any business practice whose net social
effects make it undesirable. This approach would give the Commission considerable
latitude and flexibility. For the reasons stated in text, however, it appears that the
approach would probably diverge too greatly from the congressional intent underlying
Section 5 to be appropriate.
2.33 A case based on established public policy may be an exception to this rule.
But see note 254 infra.
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don will ever touch is that competition which has for its object the destruction
of competition. There is no unfair competition that is consistent with the en-
durance of any competition." 34 This is not to say that non-economic values
have no place in the equation. They are unquestionably relevant and impor-
tant. considerations, and ones alluded to throughout the debates over the an-
titrust laws. In enforcing the provisions of Section 5, however, the Commis-
sion must recognize that social or political considerations alone cannot carry
the entire weight of the argument. 235
234
 51 CONG. REC. 11385 (1914). Senator Cummins appears to have somewhat
overstated his position here. Section 5 presumably will reach conduct which injures
competition, as well as that which "destroys - it. The significant point about this quota-
tion, however, is that it focuses the analysis exclusively on competitive effects.
233 The somewhat limited role of non-economic values is suggested by the fol-
lowing exchange: •
MR. CUMMINS. If anything can he more indefinite or vague than the
prohibition against the restraint of trade or commerce, it has yet to he
brought to my attention. What is a restraint of trade or commerce depends
entirely upon one's economic and sociological view of industrial society.
MR. LIPPITT. Psychological.
MR. CUMMINS. No; I will not include psychological; I do not believe it
involves that element in our affairs. We are here endeavoring to sustain
competition; that is the primary purpose of the antitrust law; it is the chief
object of all these laws that we are now proposing; it is the only justifica-
tion for the establishment of a trade commission; for if we do not desire to
maintain the competitive force as part of our industrial commercial life,
then all these things are unnecessary.
Id. at 11104. It is possible that Senator Cummins intended to make a distinction here
between psychological and sociological values, but the overall context of his remarks
would suggest not. The Supreme Court. has recently expressed similar reservations
about the use of non-economic values as a sole basis for an action:
We arc ... unable to accept Judge Browning's interpretation of Schwinn. In
his dissent below he argued that the decision reflects the view that the
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of in-
dependent businessmen even though they have no impact on 'price, qual-
ity, and quantity of goods and services,' 537 F.2d at 1019. This view is
certainly not explicit in Schwinn, which purports to be based on an exami-
nation of the 'impact [of the restrictions] upon the marketplace.' 388 U.S.
at 374. Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic
advantages, see, e.g., Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 4, but
an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any ob-
jective benchmarks. As Mr. justice Brandeis reminded us: "Every agree-
ment concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain is of their very essence."'Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United Stales, 246
U.S. at 238.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.2I (1977). The Sylvania
case itself is readily distinguishable as a private action for treble damages under the
Sherman Act, but the reasoning behind the Court's approach may have a more gen-
eral applicability. For a discussion of the case see Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1977). Cf.
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (non-
economic values cannot be raised as an affirmative defense to an antitrust charge)
(association members had restricted competitive bidding, and sought to justify this as
protecting the public by assuring a higher level of professional competence). See also 51
CONC., REC. 1 1 105 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins) (Commission would not, any
more than the courts, define "unfair competition" on the basis of "their own inner
consciousness").
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Notwithstanding this possible limitation, it appears that the Commission
can consider a wide variety of factors when exercising its public policy powers
under Section 5. Some possible elements in the equation were listed by
Senator Cummins:
lilt will be the duly of the [Commission] to consult the decisions of
the couts, the learning of the time, the custom of' merchants, the
habits of trade, the writings of studious and thoughtful men, all of
which go to make up our understanding of the words 'unfair com-
petition.' It will be the duty of the commission to apply those words
in that sense precisely as it is now, the duty of the court to apply the
words 'undue restraint of trade' in the sense in which we commonly
understand that phrase.'"
B. Speny & Hutchinson
This aspect of the legislative history has given rise to surprisingly few
cases. There is, in fact, only one major case considering the Commission's
power to establish public policy on competition. Thai is the important Su-
preme Court decision in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 2  The case involved
the operation of a trading-stamp business. Sperry & Hutchinson (S&H) man-
ufactured the stamps and sold them to retail stores; the stores gave them to
customers as a bonus on their purchases; and the customers then redeemed
the stamps with S&H for additional merchandise. Problems in this business
arose when independent trading-stamp exchanges were opened. The ex-
changes permitted customers to trade one brand of stamps for another. This
process undermined S&H's goodwill, since customers then lost their motiva-
non lo return 10 stores offering its stamps; they could go to other stores and
still complete their stamp books through trades. S&H therefore embarked
upon a program of suppressing the stamp exchanges. It accomplished this by
claiming to retain title to the stamps, and by thereafter litigating against all
exchanges which dealt. in those stamps without authorization. This course of
conduct., all parties agreed, violated neither the letter nor the spirit of any of
the antitrust laws.
The Commission nonetheless found that. S&H's action constituted an un-
fair method of competition under Section 5, evidently on a theory that it. was
unfair to destroy an entire collateral industry such as the exchanges.'" The
Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that Section 5 would reach only violations of the
letter or spirit. of the antitrust. laws.'" The Supreme Court reversed again,
holding that the Commission, "like a court of equity,- could consider "public
values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the
spirit of the antitrust laws. " 240
"" 51 Come. RFC. 13048 (1914).
" 7 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
2 " The initial Commission decision was discussed in two casenotes. See 57 Geo.
1082 (1969); 67 Mien. 1.. REV. 560 (1969). The circuit court decision was discus-
sed in three casenotes. See 12 B.C. INF). & Con. L. REV. 982 (1971); 71 Coumt. I.. REV.
476 (1971); 49 Tr.x. Riv. 791 (1971).
2 " 432 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 1970).
4 " 405 U.S. at 244. The Supreme Court decision was reported in a number of
CaSCHGI CS. See 22 CATH. Li. 1.. REv. 697 (1973); 26 RUTGERS L. Rev. 427 (1973); 17
ANTITRUST BULL. 975. 984 (1972); 58 A.B.A. J. 511 (1972).
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This result was by no means preordained. Although the Fifth Circuit was
clearly incorrect in omitting public policy cases from the reach of Section 5
altogether, it was not clear that the Commission's actual decision was a proper
exercise of the powers that it did possess in that regard. The decision in Sperry
& Hutchinson evidently involved something more than the violations of settled
business norms that were discussed in the previous section. The company's
attempt to retain title to its stamps was certainly not contrary to the estab-
lished morals of the community. 241 Moreover, its means of enforcing its
contentions—through litigation in the courts—has always been considered
permissible conduct. 242 The Commission's decision was therefore based on a
more ad hoc judgment that the actions taken by S&H were substantively un-
fair.
The Supreme Court, by holding this to be an appropriate basis for a
decision, thus confirmed that the Commission is empowered to frame public
competition policy on its own initiative. The Court did not state precisely how
far this power would extend. It appears most probable, however, that the
Court reached the same conclusion that was derived above from the legislative
history, and understood the Commission's authority to be coterminous with
the existence of any significant injury to competition. The Court observed
that. it was possible to have an anticompetitive effect that is not violative of the
antitrust laws, and still violate Section 5. 243 Moreover, in a footnote to the
opinion the Court cited, with apparent approval, 244 a Commission policy
statement in which such injury was identified as sufficient grounds for finding
"unfairness." Conduct could be improper if it "causes substantial injury to .
competitors or other businessmen '245 The Court was not without some
24 ' It may have been an improper restraint on alienation, under the then-
current Schwinn rule, but the Commission expressly declined to decide the case on that
basis. See 405 U.S. at 247 n.6.
242 Cf: California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972) (Hoerr-Pennington doctrine extended to good-faith adjudicatory proceedings).
241 See 405 U.S. at 246.
244 The circuit courts have generally assumed that the quoted passage reflects
the Supreme Court's own views. See Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 11.8 (7th
Cir. 1976); Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. -1974).
245 405 U.S. at 244-45 11.5. This was only one of three criteria of unfairness
that the Commission had listed. The manner in which the Court italicized the passage
suggests that the three should be read in the disjunctive, however, so that any one
could state a cause of action. The Court's footnote reads in full as follows:
The Commission has described the factors it considers in determining
whether a practice that is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor de-
ceptive is nonetheless unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously consid-
ered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes,
the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at
least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established
concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or'
other businessmen): Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation
Rule. 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking. 20 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964).
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precedent. for this interpretation. At least one commentator had suggested
that Section 5 could be construed only as reaching all forms of injury to com-
petition.'" At least one lower court case, moreover, had previously found a
course of conduct to be "un fair" on the sole basis of the harm it did to com-
petition in another line of commerce. 247
This interpretation of Sperry & Hutchinson is consistent with the legal
theory being discussed in this section. It does not, however, account for all the
language that appears in the Court's opinion. Running throughout the deci-
sion are passages that might indicate a broader reading than that pyesented
above. Three stich passages will bear special mention. The first is the Court's
reference to "public values'' as the basis for an action—a cryptic term that was
left undefined, but that seems to imply something more than competition pol-
icy. The second passage identifies conduct as being potentially unfair if' it.
were "immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, - and treats this as a
category separate from conduct that demonstrably injures a competitor or a
consumer. 2" Finally, a third passage involves the Court's remark that "un-
fair competitive practices fare] not limited to those likely to have anticompeti-
tive consequences after the manner of the antitrust laws .... " 2-19 Wh en
viewed in combination, these three parts of the ()pinion seem to suggest. that
the Commission can define an "unfair method of competition - on the basis of
other factors in addition to its competitive effects.
Upon closer examination, however, the quoted language does not appear
to he so expansive. The language evidently refers, not to the Commission's
powers under "unfair methods of competition, - but rather to its powers
under "unfair or deceptive acts or practices.'' This latter concept found its
way into the case through a series of more or less procedural errors. Sperry &
Hutchinson originally had been brought. as a competition case, and was dis-
posed of by the Commission on that basis. By the time it reached the Su-
preme Court, however, the litigants were agreed that it sounded primarily in
consumer protection and that significant. harm to competition had not been
threatened. The main problem lay in the restrictions on the use to which
SM.] argues that a later portion of this statement commits the FTC to the
view that misconduct in respect of the third of these criteria is not subject
to constraint as 'unfair' absent a concomitant showing of misconduct ac-
cording to the first or second of these criteria. Rut all the FTC said in the
statement referred to was that 'Whe wide variety of decisions interpreting
the elusive concept of unfairness at least makes clear that a method of sell-
ing violates Section 5 if it is exploitive or inequitable and if, in addition to
being morally objectionable. it is seriously detrimental to consumers m-
others.' /bid. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis in Court's opinion).
2 " See Pearson, Section 5 of.
 the Federal Trade Commission Act as Antitrust: A Com-
mend. 47 B.U. I,. Rev. 1 (1067).
"7 See LaPeyre v. FTC. 366 F.2d 117. 121 (5th Cir. 1966). The respondent in
that case held a legal patent monopoly, however, and so may have been under a spe-
cial ditty to deal on non-discriminatory terms. It is not dear 110W munch importance the
Filth Circuit attached to this circumstance.
2" See 4/15 U.S. at 244-45 11.5 and note 245 supra.
"an 405 U.S. at 244.
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consumers could put their stamps. Although approving in principle the
policy-oriented process by which the case had been decided, therefore, the
Court remanded it to the Commission for fresh findings and opinion. 25" In
so doing the Court also thought it advisable to include some general guidance
for the new proceeding. No Supreme Court case previously had construed the
term "unfair practices" outside of a competition setting, 251 and the Court took
this occasion to elaborate on the concept. Thus the "public values' . being re-
ferred to are primarily the values of fair consumer dealing. 252
Although the Court's discussion of "public values" does not bear directly
on the Commission's power to establish public policy on competition, there is
one respect in which it will directly expand the meaning of "unfair methods
of competition." The "public values" being referred to include the strictures
against immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous conduct—in short,
they include the established public policies that were identified as a basis for
action in the previous section. Keppel and the other cases discussed there,
however, would allow enforcement of only those moral standards that were
widely shared in the business community. Sperry & Hutchinson, on the other
hand, when read in light of its legislative history, 253 will evidently allow the
Commission to base a decision on ethical considerations that have not yet won
universal acceptance, provided only that it meets the overarching requirement
of showing some harm to competition from their non-observance. 254
Id. at 250. It is conceivable that these events will in sonic ways weaken the
value of the decision as a precedent for future competition cases. They may allow the
decision to he distinguished, for example, so that the Commission's latitude could be-
come less in competition than in consumer-protection matters. There seems no reason
to believe, however, that this particular quirk of the case should be significant. The
Court's remand may have anticipated that the new findings would involve consumer-
protection issues, but, if appropriate new facts were found, it did not preclude a dis-
position of the case on competition grounds alone. See 405 U.S. at 245, 250.
251 See Casellote. 22 CAT11. U. L. REV. 697, 699-700 (1974
252 The Court's discussion of this part of the Commission's jurisdiction was an
important step, and one that will be discussed more fully in a later section of this
article, but it does not seem to have a direct bearing on the Commission's power to
establish public policy on competition. The most able commentary has all treated Sperry
& Hutchinson as being basically a consumer-protection case. See Note, Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act—Unfairness to Consumers, 1972 Wisc. L. REV. 1071 (1972);
Casenote, 22 CAnt. U. L. REV. 697 (1973).
253 Recall the reasons that Senator Cummins gave for opposing criminal penal-
ties in the FTC Act. See text at notes 221-22 supra.
254 S&H's competition practices probably did not violate accepted business
morals, but the Court indicated that a competition action might still he brought. The
Court could not have gone further than this, and allowed the Commission to formu-
late novel moral rules that were not essential to free competition, for the reasons set
forth in the previous sections. It is quite true, of course, that Keppel banned an im-
moral practice as an "unfair method of competition" without regard to its competitive
effects. See note 200 supra. This holding has never been questioned, and it forms the
basis for the previous section's discussion of violations of recognized standards of fair
conduct_ It might therefore be thought that, if such violations are to be extended from
established moral standards to novel ones, the extension can still be made without
reference to competitive impact. The Court in S&H may have inadvertently left that
impression, observing at one point that after Keppel "unfair competitive practices were
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C. Limitations on the. Action
The powers conferred by the Spero, & Hutchinson decision arc potentially
quite broad. Their very breadth also means, however, that they are bound to
be tempered in their exercise by additional limiting rules. Three such rules
may be anticipated: (I) the Commission will be required to perform au
interest-balancing lest; (2) the Commission will not be allowed 10 promulgate
affirmative requirements; and (3) judicial review will become increasingly
strict..
Ihe first limitation is that a balancing test will probably be required of
the Commission, in which the harm to the public interest will he weighed
against the business justification for a particular practice. 25 :' Without such a
rule the Commission might he empowered to halt any practice that restricts
competition, no matter how slight. the restriction, how slight the public harm,
or how compelling the respondent's reasons for adopting the practice might.
be.•This power would be even more threatening than that-exercised by the
federal courts prior to Standard Oil, Section I of the Sherman Act had applied
only to the external dealings that one company had with others„ whereas this
power will apply to all of the company's unilateral policies as well. The Sher-
man Act., as we have seen, was soon tempered by the Rule of Reason. It seems
inevitable that this rule also will be applied to the powers that Spero & Hutch-
inson has recognized. 2 •"
A second limitation is that the Commission will remain empowered only
to prohibit. unfair practices, not. to prescribe fair ones. 2 ''.7
 At first it might
seem that the agency can bypass this proviso. If' it. can ban any practice that
harms competition, then, by appropriate Findings, it also can ban every prac-
tice except the one that it considers most conducive to competition. Carried to
an extreme, however, such a course would involve the Commission in detailed
regulation of business decisions, which is likely to be both stultifying and im-
practical. Such conduct. would also be contrary to the congressional intent.
Senator Cummins spoke directly to this point:
not limited to those likely to have anticompetitive consequences after the manner of
the antitrust laws , „ ." 405 U.S. at 244. It must be remembered, however, as the court
noted in its next sentence, that Keppel was decided before the prohibition against "un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices" was added to Section 5. 405 U.S. at 241. Previously
conduct had to be characterized as an "unfair method of competition" if it was to be
reached at all. Now that "unfair or deceptive practices" is available as an alternative
theory, however, this will he the more appropriate vehicle for reaching conduct that
has no competitive effects. Thus it is unlikely that Keppel will he extended beyond its
facts. This, it should be noted, is more a matter of analytical consistency titan a sub-
stantial limit on the Commission's powers. Other undesirable conduct can still he
reached on the theory of unfair practices, as will be discussed in the next section of
this article,
2." Sonic of the many factors that should (and should not) be included in a
balancing process were enumerated in FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339,
1343-46 (4th Cir. 1976) (on application to enjoin a merger).
25"
 Such an approach was suggested by judge Wisdom in his dissent from the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Sperry & Hutchin.son. See 432 F.2d at 155; cf. 51 CoNe.,
12915 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
2 ." (f. Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sum Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 ln licu.	 REv. 821, 852-53 (1961).
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[TJhere is nothing in this bill which attempts to give to the trade
commission the power to say to any person or to any corporation
`You must do so and so in the future.' Its only power is to declare
the legality of an act already committed ... , or to condemn the act
as unlawful, and to require that it shall no longer he committed. 258
Similar views were expressed by the bill's managers in the House of
Representatives, who, when asked to confirm that the Commission "has no
affirmative power to say what. shall be done in the future," responded: "We
desired clearly to exclude that authority ... from the Commission." 258 As a
result, if a court were to perceive excessive 218 tendencies in the direction of
imposing affirmative requirements, even if those steps were individually jus-
tified in light of Sperry & Hutchinson, it presumably would call them to a halt
by referring back to this aspect of the legislative history.
Filially, a third limitation is likely to be found in increasingly close judicial
review. Sperry & Hutchinson did not. merely recognize a broad aspect of the
Commission's jurisdiction. It also held that the Commission had not explained
its reasoning with sufficient clarity, and remanded the matter for further pro-
ceedings. That remand was made, as the Court emphasized, in order to sup-
ply a better basis for judicial review."' We may anticipate that such review
will become an increasingly important feature of FTC litigation, at least. in
cases where the Commission has acted under its general competition author-
ity. In the conventional Section 5 case the agency is to some degree con-
strained by the terms and goals of the specific antitrust statutes that it is ap-
plying, and judicial review has become correspondingly relaxed. 2 `i 2 Those
constraints will be removed in the pure "policy" case, however, and so judicial
review will become a more important safeguard.
2 " 51 CONC. REC. 12916 (1914).
2 "" 51 CONG. REC. 14938 (1914). This view emerges from the following ex-
change:
MR. SFIERLEY. If the gentleman will permit, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion differs from the Interstate Commerce Commission in that it has no
affirmative power to say what shall he done in the future:3
MR. STEVENS, Certainly ... We desired clearly to exclude that authority
from the power of the Commission. We did not know as we could grant it
anyway. But the time has not arrived to consider or discuss such a ques-
tion.
51 CONC. Rec. 14938 (1914). For similar comments see 51 CONC. REc. 12917 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Cummins) ("It is absurd; ... it is not the purpose of those who
are favoring this bill that any such course shall be pursued"); id. at 13052 (remarks of
Senator Walsh); id. at 14932 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Covington) ("The Fed-
eral Trade Commission will have no power to prescribe the methods of competition to
he used in the fUture - ).
2 " Some increasing discretion in this regard is to he expected. Senator Cum-
mins and his colleagues opposed the grant of peremptory powers in large part because
they doubted their constitutionality. With administrative law now more favorably dis-
posed toward the delegation of such powers, Congress' constitutional concerns have
lost much of their force. Still, however, Congressman Stevens' remarks suggest that the
Commission was denied the power of promulgating affirmative requirements for other
policy reasons as well.
251 See 405 U.S. at 249. About eighty percent of the citations to Sperry & Hutch-
inson are made for this proposition.
252 This point is discussed in more detail in text at notes 290-303 infra.
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Some commentators have argued for a fourth limitation as well. They
point out that Section 5 is phrased in terms of unfair "methods'' of competi-
tion, and suggest. that it should therefore reach only instances of active or
calculated misconduct. It should riot support. they say, oligopoly or other
theories that are based primarily on market. structure rather than on identifi-
able misconduct. 2 "" This argument is probably accurate insofar as Congress
anticipated that Section 5 would work primarily through conduct rather than
through structural theories, but. it does not follow that the structural case was
affirmatively precluded. Certainly the language of Section 5 does not. rule it
out. The reference to "methods - of competition was, as we saw above, ` ".` in-
troduced only as filler, to prevent confusion with the common law concept. of
unfair competition. Similarly, the word "competition" itself would riot seem to
have any particular implication of active conduct as opposed to overall com-
petitive posture. Since the letter of Section 5 is thus inconclusive as to the
propriety of structural litigation, the Commission should resolve that issue ac-
cording to the underlying legislative purposes. The ultimate purpose of Con-
gress was to deal with the problems of monopoly and market. power, and to
halt trends toward concentration before they culminated in outright
monopolization. If developing economic and antitrust analysis now indicates
that a structural case is the best means of achieving this goal, therefore, it may
be permissible under Section 5.
VII. CONDUCT CONSTITUT/NG AN
"UNFAIR ACT OR PRACTICE -
Up until this point. we have considered only four words in Section 5—its
prohibition against "unfair methods of competition." The section, however,
" This view has been expressed by Kruse, Deconcentration and Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, '16 GEO. WASH. 1.. REV. 200 (1978). A distinction should
be drawn between such cases and those involving structural situations affecting primar-
ily a single firm. It is already fairly clear that the latter type of case can be brought
under Section 5. Mergers and director interlocks have been successfully challenged at.
the Commission level, for example, although linguistically speaking these do not
involve "methods -
 of competition in the ordinary sense of the term. See, e.g.. In re
Perpetual Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608 (1977), dismissed due to super-
vening legislation, Sept. 6, 1979 (director interlock). These cases have been generally
accepted despite the tact that there is at least some indication in the legislative history
that such "structural -
 parts of the Clayton Act were not to be incorporated into Section
5. See 51 Cosc. Rye:. 11103 (I 914) (remarks of Senator . Cummins); cf. id. at 12939
(remarks of Senator Newlands) (by implication). But see id. at 11107, 12980 (remarks of
Senator -
 Newlands). In this situation, Senator Newlands' views should be considered
more authoritative. See id. at 11103, 11106 (remarks of Senator Cummins). Cases of
this sort are still somewhat easier to justify than those based on pure oligopoly theory
because the steps involved in bringing about a merger or director interlock are, to
sonic extent, active fOrms of conduct. Further, since these cases utilize the letter and
spirit of specific terms of the Clayton Act as reference points they imply a less expan-
sive view of the Commission's direction.
254 See text at notes 28-30 supra.
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also goes on to prohibit. "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 2 " 5 The sec-
ond clause has become particularly important since Sperry & Hutchinson gave
such an expansive reading to its terms. It should therefore he asked whether
this language will add anything to the Commission's authority in competition
matters.'"
For the most part, of course, it will not. The reference to "deceptive acts
or practices" appears to be directed exclusively toward questions of consumer
harm, and the reference to "unfair acts or practices" primarily so. Still, this
leaves open the possibility that an activity normally characterized as an unfair
method of competition might also be challenged as an "unfair practice." This
in turn leads to two questions. First, can the Commission in fact bring a com-
petition case on that. theory? Second, are there any significant benefits to be
gained by doing so?
A. Requirements for the Action
The threshokl question is whether it is possible to bring any competition
case on a theory of "unfair acts or practices." This question should be
answered separately for each of t.wo different situations. The case is easy
when a particular course of conduct. harms both competitors and consumers.
The case is harder when the harm is felt primarily or exclusively by com-
petitors.
It is reasonably clear, in the first place, that a single course of conduct
may injure both competitors and consumers in equal measure. In that event
the prohibitions on "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair acts or prac-
tices" will meet and overlap. The conduct may be challenged under either
aspect of Section 5, or under both aspects simultaneously. This, in fact, was
the situation involved in Spent' & Hutchinson. 267 The harder case arises when
the harm is felt. primarily by the respondent's competitors. Such a case may be
litigated under a theory of "unfair practices," but only if it will fit within the
limitations inherent in that concept. There appear to be two such limitations.
The phrase contemplates only harm to consumers, and it contemplates only
harm that is direct rather than circumstantial.
2" "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful. - 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (1976).
21" This section of the paper. dealing briefly with a separate and equally com-
plex body of law, should he considered more skeletal, preliminary and tentative than
the others. For general discussions of the scope of Section 5, with emphasis on the
second clause, see Schwartz, Regulating Unfair Practices Under the FTC Act: The Need for
a Legal Standard of Unfairness, 11 AKKos Rrv. 1 (1977); Erxleben, The. FTC's Kaleido-
scopic Unfairness Statute: Section 5, 10 GoNzAGA L. REV. 333 (1975); Maclmyre & von-
Brand, Unfair Methods of Competition as an Evolving Concept—Prelude to Consumerism, 44
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1071 (1970); Note, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act—
Unfairness to Consumers, 1972 Wisc. I.. REV. 1071 (1972); Note, Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act; Al, Elastic Anti-trust Supplement, 2 LOY. CHI. L. J. 306 (1971).
2"7 See 405 U.S. 233, 247-48 (1972).
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The first requirement for an action is that it be cast in terms of redress-
ing a harm to consumers. This part of Section 5 does not seem to include
notions of commercial fairness vis-a-vis one's competitors. A case therefore
may be brought only against those competitive methods that also result, as a
collateral matter, in some substantial degree of consumer injury. 2 " 8
 This re-
quirement is a product of the statute's legislative history. The prohibition on
"unfair acts or practices" was not part of the original FTC Act. it was instead
added by the Wheeler-Lea amendment in 1938. 219 The circumstances lead-
ing up to the amendment indicate that its sole purpose was to simplify and
clarify existing law for the benefit of consumers, rather than to confer new
competition powers on the Commission.
From its very beginning Section 5 was capable of reaching practices
whose primary harm lay in their effect on purchasers. Such practices could be
legitimately characterized as unfair methods of competition, since they gave
firms a competitive advantage over other companies that did not resort to
sharp sales practices. A number of cases were successfully prosecuted on this
theory. Keppel, for example, was decided on the finding that the respondent's
practices had cut into the market share of companies that did not use gam-
bling techniques to sell their candy. 270 In appropriate circumstances the
courts would even infer, from the lure that a particular unfair practice might.
exert on consumers, the requisite injury to compoition. 27 '
This particular form of pleading was, however, a needlessly complicated
way to reach practices that were actually considered unfair in and of them-
selves. It also contained procedural pitfalls into which the Commission stum-
bled from time to time. In FTC v. Ralada.m Co., 2 " for example, the Commis-
sion clearly established the harmfulness of a certain practice to consumers but
neglected to call any competitors as witnesses, and thus neglected to show the
requisite harm to competition. 27" The Supreme Court. thereupon set. aside
the Commission's order, observing that "unUr trade methods are not. per se
unfair methods of competition." 274
 The Wheeler - Lea amendment was passed
to prevent a recurrence of these events. Congressman Lea explained the pur-
poses of his bill as follows:
2"
 This statement gives the general rule for the majority of cases. An excep-
tion might have to be made for cases brought under certain of the S&H criteria,
rectifying harm to "competitors or other businessmen
- or correcting violations of "pub-
lic policy." See note 245 supra. The contours of these S&H criteria have not vet been
fully clarified. The point at which their legal theory becomes one of unfair competition
likewise remains uncertain.
2 "" Sre 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
270
 FTC v. R.F. Kcppcl & Bro., Inc_ 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934). See note 200
supra.
271 See, e.g„ FTC v. Standard Educ. Soey, 86 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1936) (L.
Hand, ,J.) ("perhaps we 'night take judicial notice of that without any evidence at all''),
rev'd in part on other growth's, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). See also Sears Roebuck 3: Co. v. FTC,
258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919); y: FTC r. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216
(1933); FTC v. Winstcd Hosiery Co„ 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922),
272
 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
273
 M. at 652-55.
27, Id. at 649.
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If this bill becomes law, one of the things it will do is to relieve the
Federal Trade Commission of ... unnecessary time and expense in
showing that an act is injurious to a competitor. Indeed, the princi-
ple of the act is carried further to protect the consumer as well as
the competitor. In practice the main feature will be to relieve the
Commission of this burden, but we go further and afford a protec-
tion to the consumers ()I' the country that they have not heretofore
enjoyed. 275
Senator Wheeler similarly noted that. the bill "makes the consumer who may
be injured by an unfair trade practice of equal concern before the law with
the merchant injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor."'"
Thus the legislative history makes it clear that the focus of the Wheeler-Lea
Act was on the problems of consumer protection. The Supreme Court has so
interpreted the statute. In the Court's words, the Act was "a significant
amendment showing Congress' concern for consumers as well as for com-
petitors." 2 " Hence any action brought under the "unfair practices" clause of
Section 5 should be phrased in terms of consumer injury.
The second requirement for an "unfair practices" action is that the harm
to consumers be direct. This portion of Section 5 will reach only those ac-
tivities that affect specific individual consumers, in other words, rather than activ-
ities that circuitously affect all consumers, in their capacities as members
of the general public, by bringing about. some adverse change in the competi-
tive environment.'" An example may help illustrate the distinction. The use
of abusive debt-collection practices will directly harm the individual consumers
involved, but an anticompetitive merger will have its primary effect on the
general business environment and will affect, individual consumers only indi-
rectly. Hence the collection practice, but not the merger, should he reachable
as an "unfair act or practice." No case expressly relying on this rationale has
been found, but it follows naturally from the legislative history. There are
three reasons for this conclusion. First, if the Wheeler-Lea Act covered harm
to business processes it would be duplicative of the prohibition against. "unfair
methods of competition." Second, if Congress intended the Act to reach such
indirect injuries it would have referred to the beneficiaries of that legislation
as "the public" rather than as "consumers." Third, if the Wheeler-Lea Act
were to reach indirect competitive injuries it would swallow all pre-existing
antitrust legislation, including the original FTC Act. itself. With them it would
take all the boundaries and rules—both legislative and judicial—that had
83 CoNG. REc. 391-92 (1938), This is a paraphrase of H.R. REF'. No. 1613,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1937). See also S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., at
2-3 (1930).
83 Com:. Rec. 3255 (1938). This legislative history is reviewed in Lichten-
stein v. FTC, 194 F.2d 007, 009-10 (9111 Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 819 (1952).
2" FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384 (1965). See also, e.g., Scien-
tific Mfg. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640. 643-44 (3d Cir. 1941); Pep Boys—Manny,
11oe iZ Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 101 (3d Cir. 1941); NIinter v. FTC. 102 F.2d
09, 70 (3d Cir. 1939).
2 " This statement again gives only the general rule to which some exceptions
may be recognized. See note 268 supra.
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been built. up in the competition area. This would clearly be the most sweep-
ing possible reform. Its very magnitude indicates that it cannot he implied on
a silent. legislative record, however. Since Congress gave no indication that it
intended to make such changes, one must assume that the Act was not in-
tended to reach indirect competitive injuries. 27 "
B. Benefits qf the Action
The two limitations discussed above are not insuperable. From time to
time there will be a competition problem that also brings about some smaller
but nonetheless direct injury to consumers. The Commission will then have
the legitimate option of challenging such a problem as an unfair practice.
This raises, however, the obvious question: Why bother? What benefits are
gained by pursuing a complicated rather than direct legal theory?
The potential benefits of the "unfair practices" action are of two general
kinds. It is not expected that these will be important in a large number of
cases, but they may prove useful on occasion. The first set of benefits is pro-
cedural. An "unfair practices -
 approach will allow use of the more favorable
rulemaking and remedial powers that were conferred on the Commission by
the Magnuson-Moss Act.z" 0
 That subject is beyond the scope of this paper,
although it may be observed that the existence of these special powers will
soon force the courts to clarify the boundary between competition and
unfair-practice cases. The second kind of benefit is more substantive. An ac-
tion framed in terms (if unfair practices can be prosecuted without any show-
ing of harm to competition. 2fil
This result is not wholly in line with the congressional purpose. Although
Congress was quite clear in its desire to eliminate the need for showing com-
petitive harm, it perceived this reform as being primarily a matter of adminis-
trative rationalization. The change was made to simplify the prosecution of
practices that were harming competition in any event. One congressman de-
scribed the Wheeler-Lea Act. as "a more or less procedural amendment about
which there is no controversy." 282 This was, moreover, the Commission's
contemporaneous understanding of the measure. At the hearings on the bill
27 " A contrary argument can be stated, however. See Carstenscn & Questal, The
Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 10 Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers,
63 Co RNELi. L. REV. 841 (1978).
2N"
 That Act, for example, authorizes the Commission "... to recover a civil
penalty ... against any person, partnership, or corporation which violates any rule
under this chapter respecting unf'air or deceptive acts or practices ....- 15 U.S.C. §
45(m)(1)(A) (1976). See also id. at §§ 45(m)(I)(B), 57b. Congress was explicit in its de-
sire to limit these new powers to matters involving "unfair practices" rather than "un-
fair methods of competition." See, e.g., H . R. REP. No. 1606, 93c1 Cong., 2d Sess., at 32
(1974) (Conference Report): 120 Cow.. REc. 21978 (1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
2N1
 It might be thought that there is another substantive benefit to be had. An
action framed in terms of unfair practices can take advantage of the broad reading
that Sperry & Hutchinson gave to that term. This benefit, hoWever, does not seem par-
ticularly persuasive. The Court would presumably define the word "unfair" just as
broadly in the context of "unfair methods of competition." Thus it is not necessary to
proceed under a strained statutory construction in order to make use of that case.
2" See 83 CONG. REC. 393 (1938) (remarks of Congressman Mapes).
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Commissioner E•in L. Davis stated that the amendment did not make any
change "in the actual operation, actual result, except to make unnecessary the
most exacting and specific requirements of having to always prove competi-
tion and injury to competitors after all of the other elements in the case have
been established. -253 He further stated:
Perhaps not. one time in a thousand cases would there be a case
where the Commission was not able to .. mak[e] out a case of com-
petition and injury to competitors ... but [the Raladam holding] had
put the Commission to a great deal of time and delay .... 2N4
Although Congress' primary goals may have been limited and manage-
rial, there is no doubt that the Wheeler-Lea Act did extend the substantive
reach of the Commission. 285 It was extended by the one case in a thousand
to which Commissioner Davis had alluded; that case now could be brought
where it could not have been brought before. It was to be some years, how-
ever, before this new jurisdiction was utilized. Most Commission actions under
the Wheeler-Lea Act involved consumer deception, a matter that. could have
been prosecuted under previous law. The few cases that proceeded on an
"unfairness" theory were concentrated almost entirely in an effort. to suppress
games of chance as a sales device. 28" This was likewise an area in which
competitive harm could have been—although now it need not 287— be proved.
Only in the past. few years has the Commission challenged conduct as being
substantively unfair to consumers in circumstances where competitive injury
could have been neither alleged nor demonstrated. One such case was Spiegel,
Inc. v. FTC, 2" in which the Commission secured an injunction against the
bringing of debt-collection suits in an inconvenient forum. Although this as-
pect of the Commission's powers has been exercised only recently, it seems to
be well established. It was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Sperry
& Hutchinson . 28" As a result, a pure theory of unfair practices now will fur-
nish an effective basis for action.
There are two circumstances under which it might be useful to bring a
competition case on that basis. The first is where there are problems of evi-
dence. A respondent's conduct might in fact be injurious to competition, but
2
" 3 Hearings on S. 3744, 74th Cong., 2c1 Sess., at 76 (1936).
2"k Id .
2" See Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 017, 919 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Wheeler-Lea Act supplemented, rather than modified, the phrase "unfair methods of
competition"); cf: Ritholz v. March, 105 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
284' See, e.g., Gellman v. FTC, 290 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1961); Surf Sales Co. v.
FTC, 259 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1958); Wolf v. FTC,. 135 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1043). One
comment states that until recently the game-of-chance cases were the only unfair prac-
tice suits the Commission brought. See Note, 1972 Wisc. L. REV. 1071 (1972).
2"7 See Feitler v. FTC, 201 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953);
Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
753 (1944).
2" 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
See 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972) (Commission can "proscribe practices as unfair
or deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of their nature or quality as
competitive practices or their effect on competition").
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in a way that would make those results difficult or impractical to prove. If the
other elements of the case are present, however, the conduct can be reached
in an unfair-practice action. Second, this approach might be useful in reach-
ing conduct that is similar to an antitrust offense, but that is committed by a
business entity that does not literally engage in "competition." Such a situation
may arise from time to time with respect to partially regulated monopolies.
There an action based upon an "unfair practices" theory can be an effective
means of enforcing the underlying legislative purposes of Section 5.
VIII. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL. REVIEW
This final section will discuss the scope of judicial review. The section
does not. deal with the substantive reach of Section 5, but rather with the
procedural question of what standards the courts will apply when reviewing a
Commission determination that Section 5 has been violated. Although its
focus is different from that of the previous sections, however, its subject mat-
ter is of one piece with the general problem being considered. The reach of
the agency's authority under Section 5 will he considerably influenced, as a
practical matter, by the extent of latitude that is left to its expert judgment.
This factor now tends to favor the Commission's discretion. The courts show,
on the whole, considerable willingness to accept the Commission's judgment
of the business consequences to be expected from a given type of conduct.
The Commission was not always so fortunate in the standard of review.
In the early cases arising under the FTC Act the courts emphasized that the
words "unfair methods of competition" set out a legal standard.'" "It is for
the courts, not the Commission, ultimately to determine as a matter of law
what they include." 291
 This statement was reasonable enough in principle,
but the courts then used their general power of statutory construction to
judge the propriety of the individual business methods that were at issue be-
fore it. This practice led the courts into consideration of the business effects
to be anticipated from the challenged conduct. and thus, in effect, into a re-
consideration of each case on its merits. 2 • 2
The courts eventually replaced this practice by- the modern standard of
restrained review. The change was made in the Keppel decision. Although
reaffirming the courts' ultimate power to define the scope of Section 5,'"
2 "" Another possible basis for judicial review has toil proven particularly impor-
tant. Section 5(b) of the FTC Act requires that a Commission action he "to the interest
of the public." This standard has occasionally been invoked to keep the Commission
from intervening in a purely private dispute. See FTC. v. Klcsner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929)
(confusing names on two neighboring shops). Except for the very clearest cases of
impropriety, however, the Commission is left with "broad discretion" on this point. See
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 1 20 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941).
2 " FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (192(1).
2"2 See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923): FTC v. Curtis Publishing
Co„ 260 U.S. 568 (1923); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
253 Since Keppe/ the courts have consistently asserted this ultimate power, al-
though perhaps with decreasing emphasis. See, e.g., v. Texaco, inc., 393 U.S. 223,
226 (1968); Ashville Tobacco Board or Trade Inc. v. FTC, 294 12.2d 619 (4th Cir.
1961); Ardelle, Inc. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1039).
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Keppel announced a new willingness to rely on the Commission's special exper-
tise. The Court stated:
While this Court has declared that it is for the courts to determine
what practices or methods of competition are to be deemed unfair,
in passing on that question the determination of the Commission is
of weight. It was created with the avowed purpose of lodging the
administrative functions committed to it in 'a body specially compe-
tent to deal with them by reason of information, experience, and
careful study of the business and economic conditions of the indus-
try affected'.... If the point were more doubtful than we think it,
we should hesitate to reject the conclusion of the Commission, based
as it is upon clear, specific and comprehensive findings supported by
evidence."'
The review standard announced in Keppel has been maintained in the more
recent. decisions. If anything it has evolved in the direction of yet more re-
strained review.'" Keppel spoke of giving "weight" to the Commission's de-
terminations, but the modern cases speak in terms of "great weight.'" The
Commission's judgment of specific business mattersas opposed to its ulti-
mate disposition of the case—may stand on a firmer footing still.z" 7 From
this it follows that a stronger case can usually be built on an incipiency theory
than a spirit. theory, since the Commission's decision is then likely to rest more
heavily on business predictions rather than on purely legal judgments.
It may be asked why this grant of discretion was so long in coming. The
delay was presumably due to early constitutional restrictions on the delegation
of legislative power. The so-called delegation doctrine provided that Congress
2 " FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934).
295 This evolution is responsive to the original congressional intent. Senator
Newlands had intended for the Commission's decisions to he reviewable only to the
minimum extent required by the Constitution. See 51 GONG. REC. 1 1108 (1914).
Senator Cummins at first shared this view. See id. at 11104-05. Cummins later offered
an amendment giving somewhat broader review, id. at 13045, but did so previously in
order to head off another amendment that would have provided for still broader re-
view. For an analysis of these events see id. at 13066. Senator Cummins' amendment
was eventually adopted by the Senate. Id. at. 13109. Its language was subsequently
modified by the Conference Committee, but no substantial change appears to have
been made. See REP. No. 1142 (1914); 51 Conic. REC. 14768 (1914) (remarks of
Senator Cu min ins).
2" See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223, 225-26 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co.
v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1965); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 720
(1948).
2 " On this point the Supreme Court has stated:
The precise impact of a particular practice on the trade is for the Commis-
sion. not the courts, to determine. The point where a method of competi-
tion becomes 'unfair' within the meaning of the Act will often turn on the
exigencies of a particular situation. trade practices, or the practical re-
quirements of the business in question....
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953). The Com-
mission's findings of fact will stand, of course. on the firmest fOoting of all, if sup-
ported by the record those are conclusive. See FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S.
746, 758 (1945), So too are the inferences drawn from those facts. See Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (1945).
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could not confer authority on administrative agencies without simultaneously
providing reasonably definite standards for its exercise. 2"8 Without this
safeguard it was feared that administrative agencies could exercise arbitrary
and burdensome powers, and that persons under their jurisdiction could be
subjected to sudden shifts of policy that had not been announced through the
legislative process.'" The Commission's power over "unfair methods of
competition" could have been a classic example of excessive delegation. When
announcing close judicial review and narrowing statutory constructions, there-
fore, the Supreme Court may have been endeavoring to shield Section 5 as a
whole front constitutional infirmity. 3"
The delegation doctrine was eroded by the courts during the New Deal,
at approximately the sante time that Keppel established the present standard of
restrained review. The doctrine is now largely defunct. The increasing com-
plexity of modern government has made delegation a practical necessity,
while the safeguards of niodern administrative procedure have simultaneously
made it less threatening- . The Supreme Court now regularly upholds legisla-
tion embodying such vague standards as "just and reasonable", "public in-
terest", or "public convenience, interest, or necessity".""
Although the delegation doctrine may no longer be binding constitu-
tional law, however, the policy considerations that underlay it were nonethe- ,
less valid and important. ones. Echoes of the doctrine therefore still appear to
linger in the canons of statutory construction. For example, although Section
5 speaks of "unfair methods of competition" in broad'and unqualified terins,
it was not until Sperry & Hutchinson that the Supreme Court upheld such an
action without analogizing it in some way to a violation of express antitrust
laws. This long reliance on other statutes as reference points was presumably
motivated in part by fears of excessive delegation. 3"2
 It therefore appears
that the delegation doctrine still possesses some life, and, although the stan-
dards of judicial review now are generally favorable to the Commission, the
2 "" See	 Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
2 "" A broad construction of Section 5 would have been (Nell more troublesome
if' private actions were allowed under that statute, since the penalties for non-
compliance would then have included damages. There was some reason if.) believe that.
Congress had actually contemplated private actions. See 51 CONG. REC. 13117 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Clapp, a member of Conference Committee): id. at 13158 (re-
marks of Senator Kenyon). By the 1930's, however, it had become clear that there
would be no private right of action. See Moore v. New York Conon Exchange, 270
U.S. 593 (1926) (so holding); 51 CONG. Rm. at 13120 (remarks of Senator Stone).
""" Many congressmen had expressed doubt about the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 5. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 12816 (remarks of Senator Sutherland); id. at 11113
(remarks of Senator Reed); id. at 8981 (remarks of Congressman -falcon). But see 51
CONG. REC. 12147-48 (1914) (remarks of Senator Hollis); id. at 11103 (remarks of
Senator Cummins) (although admitting that a more precise standard would be desira-
ble).
3" See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 2.03. 2.10 (3d ed. 1972).
a"
 It was also motivated by the legislative history of Section 5, of course, which
consists primarily of references to the other antitrust laws.
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doctrine can reappear in the guise of statutory construction to prevent an
excessively broad reading of Section 5."' ;
CONCLUSION
This brings us to the end of our review of the Commission's authority
under Section 5. That authority originated with congressional dissatisfaction
over the results achieved through previous legislation. Under the Sherman
Act. the control over antitrust policy had passed to the courts, and remedies
seemed to be unavailable until an industry had been monopolized or brought
to the very brink of' a monopoly. Congress accordingly established the Com-
mission as an administrative body under the control of the legislature, and
gave it broad powers to promote competition and to end unfair trade prac-
tices, especially in industries not yet in immediate danger of monopoly. In
exercising these broad powers the Commission can act to prevent several dif-
ferent. types of unfairness: violations of the letter of one of the other antitrust
statutes; incipient violations; violations of their underlying spirit; violations of
settled business norms; violations of competition policy as declared by the
agency; and, on occasion, violations that could be characterized as unfair acts
or practices.
In exercising these powers the Commission cannot act arbitrarily. It can-
not disregard the congressional antitrust policies that it is ultimately discharg-
ing, nor can it act without making careful predictions as to the likely effects of
"" This raises an interesting practical question. When the Commission wishes
to establish a novel application of" Section 5, how can it best assure that the delegation
doctrine is not invoked against it An answer to this question is suggested by referring
hack to the policy considerations that underlie the delegation doctrine in the first
place. The doctrine was established in order to protect businessmen from the exercise
of arbitrary authority and unfair surprise. The best approach to use in most doubtful cases,
therefore, would he one which minimizes these factors. That would seem to be
rulemaking. Rulemaking not only confers procedural advantages, in other words, but
it may also allow the Commission to achieve a substantive result that would otherwise
be denied to it. This conclusion is suggested by the dissenting opinion in Atlantic Refin-
ing:
The integrity of [the administrative] scheme is violated by the Commis-
sion's entering and the courts' affirming broad industry-wide orders the
meaning and basis of which are unclear and the factual and economic
analysis of which .is inadequate.... I do not steam by this that the Commis-
sion is required to use a rule-making rather than a case-by-case approach
to decision-making in this area, although it would seem that rule-making
would here be the preferable approach.... Whichever method the Com-
mission chooses to use, however, it seems obvious to me that the Commis-
sion must formulate a clear rational rule which is based on an adequate
economic: explication and takes into consideration the situation of all indus-
try members affected by the rule.
Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 390-91 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
The unfairness inherent in a test case can also be minimized by precluding later pri-
vate treble-damage activities as a result of it. The theory of the test case therefore
should be framed in distinct Section 5 terms, and it should not be described as vin-
dicating the letter of one of the antitrust statutes, in which case it might have a res
judicata effect.
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its actions on consumers, competitors, and others who would be affected. In
short, cases brought by the Commission must be measured and constructive,
and are subject to judicial review to ensure that these standards are met.
The Commission has a broad and, in some respects, unique authority in
the antitrust field. It was not intended to be a mirror image of the Antitrust
Division. It was established precisely so that it would complement and sup-
plement the work of the other agency. The special scope of Section 5 has
been expressly recognized in the legislative history and by the Supreme Court.
It is this which is the basis for a distinctive Federal Trade Commission juris-
prudence, and thereby for the Commission's special contribution to the na-
tional competition policy as a whole.
